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TORT JUSTICE REFORM
Paul David Stern*

ABSTRACT
This Article calls for a comprehensive reform of public tort law with respect to
law enforcement conduct. It articulates an effective and equitable remedial regime
that reconciles the aspirational goals of public tort law with the practical realities
of devising payment and disciplinary procedures that are responsive to tort
settlements and judgments. This proposed statutory scheme seeks to deter law
enforcement misconduct without disincentivizing prudent officers from performing
their duties or overburdening them with extensive litigation. Rather than
lamenting the dissolution of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics or the insurmountablility of qualified immunity,
reform advocates should acknowledge that the very distinction between
constitutional and common-law torts is arbitrary for purposes of individual officer
deterrence and accountability. By examining the relationship between Fourth
Amendment excessive force jurisprudence and the common-law torts of assault,
battery, and negligence, this Article highlights that the analytical distinction
between those legal doctrines imposes an improper demarcation for civil liability. If
law enforcement agencies concern themselves solely with the constitutionality of
their employees’ conduct, training concentrates on the instant moment in which
deadly force is used without substantial reflection on the conduct, including
antecedent negligence, that led to the confrontation. At the same time, whether an
officer can be held personally accountable should not be based on the intentionality
of the conduct; rather, the reprehensibleness of the conduct is a more appropriate
benchmark for individual liability. By acknowledging that tort law addresses
various types of law enforcement activity that do not necessarily rise to the level of
constitutional or criminal infractions, legislative bodies can begin conceptualizing
public tort law as an important component of criminal justice reform. But to do
so, we need tort justice reform.

* Paul David Stern currently serves as a Trial Attorney with the United States Department of Justice. The views and opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author
and do not purport to reflect the official policy or position of any department or agency of
the United States government.
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INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement accountability cannot be addressed solely
through the criminal justice system. Remedial measures in the
criminal arena, whether excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence or prosecuting malicious police officers, center on establishing sufficient deterrent and punitive mechanisms to guard
against public actor’s misconduct. Since law enforcement officials
are bestowed with unique privileges when performing their duties,
these criminal safeguards are necessary countermeasures to such
extraordinary authority. Yet, while many scholars call for reform in
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the criminal justice system aimed at bolstering police accountabil1
ity, fostering institutional advancement and incentivizing better
decision making cannot derive merely from the threat of prosecution. And, when officer misconduct does not involve the requisite
2
criminal intent to initiate criminal proceedings, their missteps can
nevertheless result in catastrophic damages, including wrongful
death. In such circumstances, the responsibility to compensate victims, deter future misconduct, and hold public officials accountable falls upon public tort law.
Tort jurisprudence has traditionally functioned as a form of
public law, granting private citizens the ability to identify wrongful
conduct and seek redress for their injuries. Like criminal law, tort
law can serve a regulatory function by retroactively condemning injurious behavior. Indeed, tort law has a long history of fostering in3
stitutional and societal reform, from the emergence of seatbelts to
4
warning labels on cigarette packs. One famous metaphor described tort law as an “ombudsman” that functions as a “weapon of
5
social progress.” When prosecutors are unable or unwilling to
bring criminal indictments against public officials, tort law can
6
empower ordinary citizens to serve as “private attorneys general.”
The call to reform public tort law is not merely victim advocacy.
Remedial regimes must recognize that not all wrongful conduct
should be treated equally. Law enforcement officials err, sometimes negligently, sometimes intentionally, and sometimes nefariously. Public tort law should reflect this reality. Officials should not
be forced to pay large judgments out of pocket because they were
poorly trained or acted in good faith on reasonable, but ultimately
1. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015), https://perma.cc/TQ2QFRM9; ANGELA J. DAVIS ET AL., POLICING THE BLACK MAN (Angela J. Davis ed., Pantheon
Books 2017); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 MINN
L. REV. 398 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Children v. Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 680 (Iowa 1983) (“In dealing with civil
damage actions for false arrest, courts apply a probable cause standard less demanding than
the constitutional probable cause standard in criminal cases. If the officer acts in good faith
and with reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the person arrested committed it, his actions are justified and liability does not attach.”).
3. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., New Seat Belt Defense Issues: The Impact of Air Bags and
Mandatory Seat Belt Use Statutes on the Seat Belt Defense, And the Basis of Damage Reduction Under
the Seat Belt Defense, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1378–80 (1989) (identifying states that have
adopted a legal duty to wear seat belts).
4. See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008) (finding the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act did not preempt a false advertising claim brought under the
state consumer protection law); Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 324
(D. Conn. 2010) (finding strict liability and negligent design action against cigarette manufacturer); Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (finding liability based
on company’s concealment of the health dangers of cigarettes).
5. John Goldberg, Tort in Three Dimensions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 326 (2011).
6. Id. at 327.
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mistaken, facts. Moreover, good-natured officers should not have
to persevere through the burdens and stresses of litigation in order
to clear their names. Even when government employees are represented by their agencies, the litigation can have an emotional toll,
as well as affect an officer’s ability to secure home mortgages, obtain insurance, and fulfill other financial obligations. The doctrine
of qualified immunity recognizes that a remedial scheme cannot
be so burdensome that it creates a disincentive for officers to
properly perform their difficult, and often dangerous, duties. Public tort law should ensure accountability but not at the risk of punishing earnest civil servants.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and its progeny, the United States Supreme Court attempted to
bolster law enforcement accountability by finding implied causes
of action for constitutional wrongs committed by federal actors.
Upon recognizing that no adequate remedy existed outside the
exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment infractions by federal
agents, the Court found that compensatory measures were a necessary remedial avenue. In the immediate years following Bivens, the
Court made clear that the intent of such implied actions is not
merely to compensate, but to ensure accountability and deter misconduct of federal actors. In so doing, the Court opined that remedies must be aimed at the individual actor in order to actualize
the perceived benefits of constitutional tort law.
Notwithstanding the laudable goals of the Bivens remedy, it has
never fulfilled its promise. As the Court began to disfavor implied
causes of action for constitutional wrongs, its case law placed tremendous strains on the ability of constitutional tort law to provide
meaningful compensation, deterrence, and accountability. Two recent Supreme Court decisions represent the zenith of efforts to
curtail Bivens’ remedy. In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court relied
on a long line of post-Bivens cases that disfavored the judicially created remedy to conclude that the slightest factual distinction from
Court precedent constituted a new context. Absent substantial justification, such new contexts do not warrant finding an implied
cause of action. While the separation-of-powers concerns surrounding the Bivens remedy are debatable, it is undeniable that the
modern restriction on the remedial measure leaves parties that
have been injured by constitutional violations without a remedy.
Even where an implied cause of action exists, the doctrine of
qualified immunity creates intractable barriers to compensation
and accountability. The Abbasi Court reiterated that implied actions remain cognizable for Fourth Amendment infractions by
federal law enforcement officers. Yet, in District of Columbia v. Wesby,
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the Court cited the rationale supporting the Abbasi decision to find
that the law enforcement officers in that case were entitled to qualified immunity when entering a home without a warrant—the exact sort of Fourth Amendment violation the Bivens remedy was
7
meant to correct. In the wake of Abbasi and Wesby, it is difficult to
conceive of Bivens as an effective safeguard against federal law enforcement misconduct.
8
Many scholars have lamented the Abbasi decision. Others have
9
railed against the doctrine of qualified immunity. Rather than eulogize Bivens or advocate for the elimination of qualified immunity,
this Article continues by questioning the very premise undergirding the Bivens decision—namely, constitutional torts require a separate and implied remedy in the law enforcement realm. By examining the relationship between Fourth Amendment excessive force
jurisprudence and the common-law torts of assault, battery, and
negligence, this Article highlights the limited nature of the Bivens
remedy and argues that bolstering the common-law tort regime
provides a more fruitful avenue for reform.
As the Supreme Court has noted, the popularity and perceived
effectiveness of a police tactic cannot determine its constitutionali10
ty. Police techniques, such as broken windows theory or conceal11
ment, often fall in and out of societal favor. Although states can
alter their approaches based on the changing times, and experts
can opine on an officer’s conformity with the communal standard
of care, the constitutionality inquiry is limited to what the Constitution permits an officer to do, rather than what an officer should do.
In that sense, the difference between constitutional and common-

7. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018).
8. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Demise of Accountability, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2149 (2018); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Decline of the Right to Redress,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2167 (2018); Case Comment, Constitutional Remedies — Bivens Actions —
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 131 HARV. L. REV. 313, 313 (2017) (“If the Court wants to continue distinguishing Bivens, for the sake of judicial candor and litigative efficiency, it should hold that
the Bivens cause of action is limited to the facts of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson.”).
9. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018); Joanna
C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017).
10. Compare George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety,
ATLANTIC
MONTHLY
(Mar.
1982),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/
(espousing the benefits of remedying minor legal infractions), with Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1620 (2012) (outlining the shortcomings of the policy), and Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence
from New York City and Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006) (outlining
empirical research challenging traditional perceptions of broken window techniques).
11. See James J. Fyfe, The Split-Second Syndrome and Other Determinants of Police Violence, in
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING 466, 475–77 (Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds.,
2010) (suggesting that tactical knowledge and concealment would minimize the risk to officers and suspects and prevent tragic mistakes).
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law tort analysis cannot be overstated. The former assesses the police conduct by establishing a floor for constitutional behavior; the
latter examines the conduct by comparing it to standard police
12
procedures. If law enforcement agencies concern themselves solely with the constitutionality of their employees’ conduct, training
concentrates on the instant moment in which an officer uses deadly force without substantial reflection on the reasons such confrontations tend to escalate. Conversely, common-law tort cases often
center on expert testimony concerning policing standards to assess
whether law enforcement entities are employing comprehensive
techniques aimed at effectuating their mission while attempting to
avoid foreseeable harm. While tort remedies cannot, and should
not, offer structural injunctive relief, monetary damages incurred
at the proper governmental level can incentivize better decision
making and encourage greater risk management.
Moreover, by delineating between excessive force and commonlaw torts, this Article suggests that many events anecdotally perceived as constitutional wrongs are, in fact, often more properly
characterized as common-law tort infractions. Bivens claims are limited to constitutional violations, thereby focused solely on the public official’s intentional acts or deliberate indifference. As the Supreme Court’s excessive force jurisprudence directs courts to assess
the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct at the precise moment
they exerted force, and the intentional force exerted, the analysis
largely ignores preceding conduct that may have proximately
caused the injury. While the plaintiff’s intervening acts can sever
the officer’s preceding conduct from constitutional scrutiny,
common-law tort jurisprudence can assess the broader array of
wrongs, including the officer’s antecedent negligence.
If the common-law tort remedial structure is to achieve what
Bivens cannot, not only must it bolster meaningful compensation,
but it must also encourage best practices and ensure accountability. In the federal context, the responsibility to meet these goals
13
should fall upon the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA
is the statutory mechanism through which private citizens may
bring actions against the federal government sounding in common-law tort. Several exceptions to the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity—most notably, the discretionary function excep14
tion —underscore that the statute was originally enacted merely as
a compensatory measure for only certain types of negligence and
12. See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV.
211 (2017).
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2018).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2018).
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wrongful acts. That paradigm changed in 1974, however, when
Congress amended the statute to permit actions based on certain
intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers—the socalled law enforcement proviso. In response to a string of illegal
no-knock raids by Department of Justice (DOJ) agents, Congress
created the proviso, in part, to deter future law enforcement abus15
es. Today, the FTCA often plays a vital, complementary role to
Bivens claims in cases involving federal officers.
Despite Congress’s intent to use the FTCA to discourage future
wrongful conduct by federal agents, the statute has never been
equipped with the requisite remedial tools to incentivize change.
Many courts and scholars view the discretionary function exception
to the FTCA as an impediment to adjudicating claims based on law
enforcement techniques and practices. As this Article explains,
such judicial hamstringing potentially undermines the intent of
the law enforcement proviso. Moreover, most settlements and
judgments under the FTCA are paid through the Judgment
Fund—a permanent, indefinite Congressional appropriation fund
that neither the agency nor officer is required to reimburse based
16
on their tortious conduct. Absent monetary liability, agencies
have no incentive to modify past practices and mitigate future
damages. Indeed, the disconnect between the agency and the
monetary award creates a perverse incentive for law enforcement
officers to either not take the litigation seriously or view the general corpus as a hush fund to pay off aggrieved victims. If commonlaw tort jurisprudence becomes the only available avenue to address tortious police tactics, the remedial regime should force the
relevant stakeholders to internalize monetary awards and promote
behavioral modification. Certainly, when officers act with evil motive or intent, disciplinary action must be taken. But when tortious
conduct stems from negligence or poor training, the internalization should be borne by the agency that trained the employee. Indeed, the economic model of tort law suggests that respondeat superior liability can encourage better decision making and foster
17
reform.
This Article calls for a comprehensive reform of public tort law
with respect to law enforcement conduct. It articulates an effective
and equitable remedial regime that reconciles the aspirational
goals of public tort law with the practical realities of devising pay-

15. See S. REP. NO. 93-588 (1973).
16. See 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2018).
17. See Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Government Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871, 886 (1991); Note, Government Tort Liability, 111
HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2018–19 (1998).
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ment and disciplinary procedures that are responsive to tort judgments. This statutory scheme better deters law enforcement misconduct without disincentivizing prudent officers from performing
their duties or overburdening them with extensive litigation. In
that sense, the distinction between constitutional and common-law
torts is arbitrary. Rather than focusing on the intentionality of the
conduct, deterrence and accountability regimes must assess the
reprehensibleness of the action. If tort law is to remain one of the
only available avenues to address substandard tactics, then legislatures must make it count. By acknowledging that tort law addresses
certain types of law enforcement activities that do not rise to the
level of constitutional or criminal infractions, legislative bodies can
begin conceptualizing public tort law as an important component
of criminal justice reform. To do so, we need tort justice reform.
This statutory remedy requires four concrete steps. First, Congress should amend the FTCA to make it the exclusive remedy for
both constitutional and common-law torts. Drawing from a previ18
ous DOJ recommendation, the amendment would render the
United States, rather than the federal actor, the sole defendant in
cases sounding in constitutional tort. In so doing, it would effectively overrule Ziglar v. Abbasi and eliminate the doctrine of qualified immunity as a viable defense in such actions.
The recommendation is a grand bargain. From a compensatory
standpoint, removing those defenses would allow for payments to
aggrieved parties whenever there is a constitutional violation. Given the recent Abbasi and Wesby decisions, it is difficult to conceive
of many cases in which a cognizable remedy still exists. At the same
time, it would unburden individual officers of the stress of litigation, which often takes a toll on personal morale and finances.
Federal officers would no longer be sued in their personal capacity—even when they act maliciously. Accountability would have to
come through the following measures.
Second, Congress should mandate that the department or agency that employed the tortfeasors pay all FTCA settlements and
judgments arising from law enforcement activity. Since a tortfeasor
and his or her agency are not currently required to reimburse the
Judgment Fund, agencies do not have “skin in the game” that incentivizes a more critical examination of past tortious (if not criminal) conduct. Without a financial stimulus, the agency is not in-

18. See Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing on S. 2117: Before the Subcomm. on
Citizens and S’holders Rights and Remedies and the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1978) [hereinafter Joint Hearing on Amendments to the
Federal Tort Claims Act].
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vested in change. The Contracts Dispute Act, 19 the 2002 NO FEAR
20
Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Foreign Intelli21
gence Surveillance Act have similar reimbursement requirements.
Mandating agencies to pay directly for their tortious conduct encourages them to review the wrongful conduct and implement new
techniques, rather than merely meet a constitutionally prescribed
22
standard of minimally acceptable conduct. Departments and
agencies cannot be so financially hamstrung by tort awards that
they are unable to perform core operational functions. At the same
time, modest settlements and judgments often lack the necessary
impact on large federal budgets to incentivize internal evaluation.
Alternative regimes, such as internal risk management offices
aimed at identifying high-risk departmental practices, should likewise be explored.
Third, to ensure that officers who act recklessly or with evil intent are held accountable, Congress should amend the FTCA to
permit punitive damages for law enforcement activity and clarify
that the discretionary function exception is not a barrier to redressability for claims arising from intentional torts listed in the
law enforcement proviso exception. The fundamental problem
with dispensing with Bivens actions in favor of lawsuits against the
United States is the absence of an effective alternative scheme to
punish bad actors. Certainly internal investigations, such as those
conducted by Inspectors General and the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility, provide critical oversight. But
the lack of transparency, public input, and individual accountability for grave constitutional violations prevented Congress from
23
adopting similar recommendations in the past.
This Article proposes that Congress should amend the FTCA to
allow for the award of punitive damages in law enforcement proviso cases. Punitive damages are awarded “to further the aims of the
criminal law: to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its fu24
ture occurrence.” Invoking § 1983 standards, punitive damages
would only be awarded in instances where the “conduct is shown to
be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless

19. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (2018).
20. See S. REP. NO. 107-143 (2002).
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 2712 (2018).
22. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 184 (1983).
23. Joint Hearing on Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 18.
24. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 297 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co.
v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”25
This legal standard better reflects when an individual officer, as
opposed to the department’s policies and procedures, should be
the subject of judicial accountability.
If Congress seeks to guard against the “skyrocketing” nature of
26
punitive damages, the statute can cap the amount or provide for
split-recovery, where a substantial portion of the award would be
27
diverted to a social program such as a victim compensation fund
28
or indigent civil litigation program.
Of course, under the proposed legal framework, individual officers are no longer defendants. While law enforcement officers
will undoubtedly be involved in the litigation, as is the case with all
FTCA matters, they would not face the same personal tribulations
as named Bivens defendants. Therefore, the punitive damages cannot be levied directly against the tortfeasor—a due-process violation that would undermine the very purpose of folding constitutional torts into the FTCA. Rather, the punitive damages incurred
by the department or agency serve as a normative springboard for
the fourth recommendation.
Fourth, Congress should devise an effective disciplinary procedure that uses the judicial award of punitive damages as an automatic trigger for employment termination proceedings and the
possible levy of fines against the tortfeasor. Aside from criminal
prosecution, disciplinary procedures have historically been intraagency procedures. Agency regulations dictated when such procedures were triggered and warranted disciplinary action. Such internal review lacks transparency and predictability. Instead, more
formal requirements should trigger automatic disciplinary steps.
This recommendation is based on the statute that allows individuals to bring civil actions to recover money damages against the
United States for willful violations of specified sections of the
Stored Communications Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-

25. Duncan v. Wells, 23 F.3d 1322, 1324 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Walters v. Grossheim,
990 F.2d 381, 385 (8th Cir. 1993)).
26. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
27. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 537.675(2), (5) (2016).
28. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 668A.1(2)(b) (1998). Any concerns regarding the constitutionality of state statutory limits on punitive damages or split-recovery statutes simply would
not exist in the context of a congressional statute wherein the United States, or its departments or agencies, would pay the punitive award. See generally Bethany Rabe, The Constitutionality of Split-Recovery Punitive Damage Statutes: Good Policy but Bad Law, 2008 UTAH L. REV.
333 (arguing split-recovery statutes are unconstitutional); Victor E. Schwartz et al., I’ll Take
That: Legal and Public Policy Problems Raised by Statutes That Require Punitive Damages Awards to
Be Shared with the State, 68 MO. L. REV. 525 (2003) (arguing split-recovery statutes are unethical and unconstitutional).
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lance Act. 29 In order to provide normative requirements to these
disciplinary procedures, the award of punitive damages by Article
III judges would automatically initiate employment termination
proceedings. Officers would still be entitled to due process
through the administrative process. Nonetheless, the mandatory
trigger would inject a neutral arbiter into the equation and give
the process regulatory standards while still affording officers a venue to argue that they acted in good faith.
30
This Article continues in four parts. Part I outlines the legal
framework surrounding constitutional and common-law tort cases
based on the conduct of federal officials. Part II confronts the jurisprudential challenges of combating law enforcement misconduct through constitutional tort law. That Part focuses on the practical limitations of a Bivens remedy as an effective mechanism for
compensation, deterrence, and accountability. It also assesses the
capability of the FTCA to serve as an effective remedial regime by
examining the extent to which constitutional and common-law tort
law are coterminous with respect to law enforcement conduct.
Specifically addressing use-of-force jurisprudence, this Part outlines how common-law torts are able to confront a broader array of
conduct than constitutional law, thereby providing a more robust
avenue for examining police techniques and training. Part III outlines the dispensation mechanism for paying FTCA settlements
and judgments in an effort to demonstrate that the payment
scheme thwarts deterrence efforts. Part IV offers concrete recommendations for legislation aimed at realigning public tort law with
the aspirational goals of compensation, deterrence, and accounta31
bility.

29. 18 U.S.C. § 2712 (2018).
30. This Article does not offer a state-by-state tort law survey. To the extent that this
Article references specific state statutes or jury instructions, the discussion serves as a guidepost through which to discuss legal principles. Otherwise, the Restatements of Torts are referenced. Nor is there a discussion of state payment schemes. Several states utilize general
judgment funds to pay tort settlements and judgments, similar to the U.S. Judgment Fund.
See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L.
REV. 1144 (2016). Forcing departments or agencies to directly pay for the tortious conduct
of their employees may be more effective at the state or local level, as such monetary damages would presumably constitute a larger percentage of their budgets than large federal
bureaucracies. Moreover, as detailed below, states can provide citizens with greater protections from government intrusion than the federal constitution by enacting stricter privilege
laws. Local municipalities would be served by examining these recommendations and tailoring them to their specific jurisdiction.
31. Criminal law is beyond the scope of this Article. For example, while the Article examines how antecedent negligence escapes constitutional scrutiny, such conduct may nevertheless be sufficient to indict on criminal negligence charges. Similarly, in some jurisdictions, criminal battery and tortious battery require analogous showings of intent. A side-byside comparison of tort law and criminal law, however, requires a deeper analysis of criminal
law than can be provided in this Article. The Article does not suggest that any newly devised
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I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF FEDERAL PUBLIC TORT LAW:
FTCA AND BIVENS
At the federal level, public tort law is comprised of two separate,
yet often parallel, litigation avenues: the FTCA and implied causes
of action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. The
FTCA provides a remedy for certain common-law torts while Bivens
actions are limited to constitutional infractions. At their inception,
both remedial regimes were created as compensatory mechanisms
for aggrieved parties injured by federal actors. As they matured,
however, their purposes evolved to include deterring law enforcement misconduct. Notwithstanding the aspirational goals of these
remedies, bureaucratic realities and jurisprudential curtailments
have rendered the current system incapable of effectuating institutional reform.
A. Federal Tort Claims Act
The Federal Tort Claims Act is the legal mechanism through
which private citizens can bring civil actions against the federal
32
government for claims sounding in tort. The FTCA waives the
government’s sovereign immunity for claims arising from negligence and wrongful acts committed by federal employees while
33
acting within the scope of their employment. FTCA coverage is
limited to circumstances where the United States, if acting like a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
34
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. Congress
elected to use the “law of the place” language to avoid devising
comprehensive federal tort jurisprudence. Instead, FTCA cases are
adjudicated based on the substantive tort law of the state where the
act or omission occurred. Actions cannot be brought against any
person or entity other than the United States, and the only available remedy is money compensation. Punitive damages and injunctive relief are not available through the FTCA.

employee disciplinary procedure should in any way interfere with the possibility of criminal
proceedings against officials who engage in law enforcement misconduct. Any civil disciplinary procedures must be devised in a way that supplements, rather than supplants, criminal
proceedings. The proposed amendment offers a concrete mechanism to initiate such proceedings by appropriately characterizing certain tortious behavior and identifying misconduct that warrants punitive damages. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see also DAN
B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 35 (2d ed. 2015).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2018).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Although the waiver of sovereign immunity appears to be quite
broad, several exceptions limit a plaintiff’s ability to sue the United
States. With respect to law enforcement conduct, three jurisdictional limitations are particularly germane. First, under the “private person analogue” provision, the United States can be held liable only in instances where the local law would make a private
35
person liable in tort. If private parties do not engage in analogous
conduct, the United States cannot be sued for engaging in such
36
behavior. Although the Supreme Court has urged courts to have
37
an expansive reading of “like circumstances,” as discussed in detail below, the notion of private person equivalence to law enforcement activities, as well as the privileges afforded to officials,
causes significant confusion and often results in inconsistent rulings.
The second relevant limitation to the government’s waiver of
sovereign immunity is the discretionary function exception. The
discretionary function exception bars claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in38
volved be abused.” The theory undergirding the exception is that,
pursuant to the separation-of-powers doctrine, the judiciary should
guard against second-guessing decisions that are reserved for the
other two branches of government. Indeed, some courts have
opined that even if the discretionary function exception were not
explicitly outlined in the text, the court would necessarily read it
39
into the statute as a matter of constitutional comity. Thus, the
discretionary function exception “marks the boundary between
Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon the United

35. United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005). Identifying the proper private person analogue for law enforcement conduct is the subject of significant debate between
courts. See, e.g., Washington v. DEA, 183 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming judgment
in favor of the Drug Enforcement Administration in an FTCA action because “the application process for, and execution of, a search warrant has no private analogue. Thus, there is
no comparable situation to the instant case where a private individual could be held liable
under state law.”); Mayorov v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 3d 678, 700–01 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (using citizen’s arrest as private person analogue); Watson v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 3d
502, 525–26 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (using a “failure to act” negligence claim as private person analogue).
36. See, e.g., Delta Sav. Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 2001);
Williams v. United States, 242 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
37. Olson, 546 U.S. at 46–47 (“As this Court said in Indian Towing, the words ‘like circumstances’ do not restrict a court’s inquiry to the same circumstances, but require it to look
further afield.”).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2018).
39. See McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 335–38 (4th Cir. 2004).
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States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from
40
exposure to suit by private individuals.”
The third limitation is the intentional tort exception. Section
2680(h) of the FTCA enumerates eleven intentional torts for
which the United States cannot be held liable: “[a]ny claim arising
out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
41
deceit, or interference with contract rights.” The original ra42
tionale for the intentional tort exception is murky at best. In
1940, a representative of the Department of Justice testified before
the United States Senate Subcommittee of the Committee of the
43
Judiciary to advocate for the exception. He explained:
[The intentional tort exception] proposes to exclude from
the cognizance of the law claims arising out of . . . a type of
tort which would be difficult to make a defense against, and
which are easily exaggerated. For that reason it seemed to
those who framed this bill that it would be safe to exclude
those types of torts, and those should be settled on the basis
44
of private acts.
Given the perceived challenges in mounting a defense to alleged
intentional torts, the Department of Justice recommended addressing such claims in the pre-FTCA fashion, whereby Congress would
45
have to pass legislation for private individuals seeking redress . In
reality, however, private legislation has not been promulgated
since the inception of the FTCA. Consequently, the enumerated
intentional torts effectively are not compensable.

40. United States v. S.A. Impresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 808 (1984) (quoted with approval in Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536
(1988)).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018).
42. LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, 2 HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
§ 13.06[1][a] (2018) (referring to the legislative history as “scant and, to some at least, unconvincing as to justification”).
43. The exclusionary section first appeared in a tort claims bill in 1931, though no explanation was provided for its inclusion. S. 211, 72nd Cong., 1st 206 (1931); see also JAYSON &
LONGSTRETH, supra note 42, § 13.06[1][a] n.4. In its report accompanying the bill, the Senate committee merely noted, “This section [28 U.S.C. § 2680] specifies types of claim [sic]
which would not be covered by this title. They include . . . deliberative torts such as assault
and battery; and others . . . .” S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 33 (1946); see also H. REP. NO. 79-1287,
at 6 (1945).
44. Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 39 (1940) (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the Att’y Gen. of the United States).
45. JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 42, § 13.06[1][a] n.4.
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B. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics
Although the Federal Tort Claims Act provides a monetary remedy for certain claims based on the common-law torts of federal actors, there is no analogous statutory scheme for constitutional
torts. Congress knew how to enact such a remedy. Indeed, it did so
with respect to state officials as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871. During Reconstruction, Congress sought to protect citizens
against state action intended to infringe upon their constitutional
rights. Congress exercised its authority under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact a statute through which private
citizens could seek civil redress for constitutional violations committed by state actors. The law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a federal
cause of action for constitutional infractions and supplements state
law in circumstances where state remedies are insufficient to re46
dress the federal infringement. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a
source of substantive rights,’ but merely ‘provides a method for
47
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” But to date, no
such statute exists for constitutional torts perpetrated by federal officials.
48
In Bivens, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether federal actors could be personally sued for unconstitutional conduct committed while acting under color of their legal
49
authority. The case arose when federal law enforcement officers
entered the plaintiff’s apartment without a warrant and arrested
him for alleged narcotics violations. The officers manacled him in
front of his wife and children and threatened to arrest his entire
family. When he was taken to the federal courthouse, he was interrogated and subjected to a strip search. The plaintiff sued for

46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or the other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceedings for redress.”). See generally AM. JUR. 2D, CIVIL RIGHTS § 16
(2018).
47. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
48. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
49. This is not to be confused with lawsuits against federal officials in their official capacity. As the Court has noted, “this distinction apparently continues to confuse lawyers and
confound lower courts.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); see also Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (clarifying that officialcapacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which an officer is an agent”) (quoted with approval in Graham, 490 U.S. at 165–66).
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damages as a result of the great humiliation, embarrassment, and
mental suffering incurred from the unconstitutional search and
seizure.
The Court held that, although the Fourth Amendment did not
50
provide for money damages “in so many words,” there existed an
implied cause of action. The Bivens decision was largely predicated
on the belief that constitutional infractions mandate federal equitable relief. Importantly, the Court arrived at its conclusion, in
part, by refuting the notion that state law provides an adequate
remedy for constitutional infractions. Justice Brennan distinguished between a constitutional violation perpetrated by a federal
agent and a tortious act committed by a private actor:
An agent acting—albeit unconstitutionally—in the name of
the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm
than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other
than his own. Accordingly, as our cases make clear, the
Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether the State in
whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit
or penalize the identical act if engaged in by a private citi51
zen.
The parameters of federal conduct proscribed in the Fourth
Amendment exist irrespective of any delineated prohibition at the
state level. If conduct authorized by state law were found nonetheless unconstitutional, the federal actor must not be permitted to
escape liability. Thus, remedies in state law may not adequately
cover constitutional infractions. In addition to the unique proscriptions of the Constitution, it was the analytical distinction between constitutional torts and common-law torts that undergirded
the Court’s belief in the need for a remedy for federally protected
rights.
C. FTCA Law Enforcement Proviso
In 1973—only two years after the Bivens decision—Justice Department agents raided the homes of two families in Collinsville,
Illinois, without warning, based on tips from confidential informants. The agents kicked in the doors, ransacked the homes, shouted obscenities, and threatened the occupants with drawn weapons
50.
51.

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
Id. at 392.
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before realizing they were at the wrong addresses. 52 Following
Bivens, the families could sue the individual officers for the constitutional violations. However, due to the intentional tort exception
to the FTCA, they were without a remedy against the United States.
Members of Congress were surprised to learn that the FTCA
barred claims based on the narcotics officers’ intentional conduct.
The Judiciary Committee noted the absurdity that “a Federal mail
truck driver creates direct federal liability if he negligently runs
down a citizen on the street but the Federal Government is held
harmless if a Federal narcotics agent intentionally assaults that
53
same citizen in the course of an illegal ‘no-knock’ raid.”
Instead of leaving these aggrieved parties without a meaningful
remedy, Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act to provide
proper financial compensation and designed a proviso “to prevent
54
future abuses of the Federal ‘no-knock’ statute.” Congress enacted the intentional tort exception proviso to permit actions against
the United States for injuries “arising . . . out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, [and] false arrest” committed by investigative
55
or law enforcement officers. The exception to the exception is
limited to any officer of the United States who is empowered by law
to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for viola56
tions of Federal law.
In carving out a proviso to the intentional tort exception, Congress understood the potential for law enforcement misconduct
and devised a limited waiver aimed at preventing future abuse. In
the words of one Senator, the proviso was created “to bring actions
directly against the Federal government to recover for the damage
[plaintiffs] sustained due to the intentional or willful misdeeds of
Federal officers. This, it seems to me, is only right and fair under
57
the circumstances.” The amendment was passed in response to
public outcry regarding federal narcotics officers engaging in
58
“abusive, illegal, and unconstitutional ‘no-knock’ raids.”

52. For a more detailed description of the events, see Jack Boger et al., The Federal Tort
Claims Act Intentional Tort Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis, 54 U.N.C. L. REV. 497, 500–02
(1976).
53. S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791.
54. Id.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018).
56. See Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50 (2013) (not limiting the proviso to investigative activities).
57. S. REP. NO. 93-469, at 33 (1973) (individual views of Senator Charles H. Percy).
58. S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2790.
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D. Carlson v. Green
Following the enactment of the FTCA law enforcement proviso,
two critical issues arose: (1) whether the FTCA permitted constitutional tort actions, and (2) if the statute provided an alternative
remedy to Bivens actions, whether the implied constitutional right
of action remained available to plaintiffs. In enacting the law enforcement proviso, the House of Representative questioned
whether the FTCA should be the exclusive remedy for constitu59
tional infractions. Although Congress decided that the proviso
would serve as a parallel action, several courts interpreted that
60
provision to permit constitutional tort claims under the FTCA. As
one court reasoned, “Congress altered section 2680(h) so that,
from the date of amendment forward . . . Fourth Amendment violations would be actionable against the government, providing aggrieved persons actual relief, rather than worthless awards against
61
‘judgment-proof’ individual agents.” Other courts ruled that constitutional claims could be adjudicated through the FTCA if the
62
state law recognized a remedy for such federal violations.
The Supreme Court addressed the interplay between the FTCA
63
and Bivens actions in Carlson v. Green. The case turned on whether
the Bivens remedy remained available even when tort law provided
a remedy that could be pursued under the FTCA. The Court concluded that constitutional violations necessitate constitutional
remedies, and absent Congress explicitly providing such protections through alternative means, Bivens remained the remedial
64
safeguard. The Court rejected the notion that the FTCA provided
the exclusive remedy in such cases because the statutory scheme
was enacted well before Bivens; rather, Congress intended the exception and Bivens to serve “as parallel, complementary causes of
65
action.” Absent explicit congressional language rendering the

59. Diana Hassel, A Missed Opportunity: The Federal Tort Claims Act and Civil Rights Actions,
49 OKLA. L. REV. 455, 463 n.59 (1996) (citing 120 CONG. REC. H5285, H5287 (1974)).
60. See, e.g., Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 140 (E.D. Va. 1977).
61. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 939 (D.
Conn. 1977) (allowing action for the constitutional tort of invasion of privacy). See generally
Hassel, supra note 59 (outlining law enforcement proviso progeny leading to Carlson decision).
62. See, e.g., Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390, 393–94 (4th Cir. 1978) (permitting
United States to assert good faith defense); Van Schaick v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 1023,
1031 (D.S.C. 1983) (permitting an FTCA action if state law “recognizes a private cause of
action for damages for constitutional deprivations”). See generally Hassel, supra note 59.
63. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
64. Id. at 18–20.
65. Id. at 20.
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FTCA the exclusive remedy, the Court was disinclined to preemptively foreclose Bivens actions.
In providing additional rationale for its public tort law jurisprudence, the Court then outlined four factors, “each suggesting that
66
the Bivens remedy is more effective than the FTCA remedy.” First,
Bivens serves a more effective deterrent purpose because it “is recoverable against individuals . . . . It is almost axiomatic that the
threat of damages has a deterrent effect, particularly so when the
67
individual official faces personal financial liability.” Second,
Bivens serves an additional deterrent impact because, unlike the
FTCA, it made punitive damages available to plaintiffs. Acknowledging that punitive damages are not available in cases in which
the defendant “did not act with a malicious intention to deprive re68
spondents of their rights or to do them other injury,” Justice
Brennan nevertheless reasoned that the threat of punitive damages
must be available against federal law enforcement officers to incentivize lawful conduct, just as they are against state actors in § 1983
actions. Third, the FTCA does not provide for jury trials. Although
the government argued that the unavailability of jury trials did not
harm plaintiffs because juries are often biased against Bivens claimants, the Court rejected that argument, believing that plaintiffs
should nonetheless retain the choice of a bench trial or forcing law
enforcement officers to stand trial before a jury of their peers.
Fourth, the Court rejected the premise that remedies for constitutional infractions “should be left to the vagaries of the laws of the
69
several States . . . .” Because FTCA actions are based on state substantive law, rather than a federal jurisprudence, it cannot serve as
a grand protectorate of constitutional rights. The Court concluded
that “without a clear congressional mandate [it could not] hold
that Congress relegated respondent exclusively to the FTCA reme70
dy.”
As the Carlson Court made clear, FTCA and Bivens actions remain parallel, but separate, causes of action. FTCA claims are
brought against the United States based on state tort law; Bivens
claims are brought against federal actors for constitutional violations. Although plaintiffs may bring claims under both remedial
regimes based on the same subject matter, the characterization of
the legal claims are often interrelated but nonetheless distinct. The
66. Id.
67. Id. at 21 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)).
68. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978) (quoted with approval in Carlson,
446 U.S. at 22).
69. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23.
70. Id.
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extent to which they satisfy their parallel goals of compensation,
deterrence, and accountability has been the subject of significant
71
debate.
II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF BIVENS REMEDIES
Although Bivens and Carlson demonstrate the Court’s early willingness to imply and support a cause of action against federal actors for constitutional violations, the Court has since curtailed the
reach of those decisions. Section A discusses how the Court limited
the implied cause of action to a narrow set of factual scenarios in
which a Bivens action may lie. Section B notes that qualified immunity law often prevents courts from reaching the constitutional
question that would prevent law enforcement abuses. Section C describes the ways in which the heightened pleading standard in Iqbal
v. Ashcroft prevents plaintiffs from reaching discovery on otherwise
colorable claims of constitutional violation. And Section D discusses how the Court’s most recent decision, Ziglar v. Abbasi, may defeat any extension of Bivens actions once and for all.
A. Limited Implied Causes of Action
At its inception, the underlying rationale for Bivens actions
against an individual official came from the concern that constitutional infractions require a constitutional remedy. The implied
cause of action was conceptualized as a pragmatic safeguard because the Court did not believe constitutional wrongs could be
properly adjudicated through state tort law. As Justice Harlan noted in his Bivens concurrence, “the appropriateness of according
Bivens compensatory relief does not turn simply on the deterrent
72
effect liability will have on federal official conduct.” It was not until the Court subsequently rejected the premise that the FTCA
could adequately remedy constitutional torts that Bivens actions
were deemed necessary to serve a deterrent effect on public officials.
As a practical matter, the Bivens remedy can only serve its intended compensatory and deterrent function to the extent the ac-

71. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 65 (1999) (denoting the Bivens remedy as a legal fiction and “a surreptitiously progovernment decision”).
72. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
407–08 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
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tion is cognizable for various constitutional infirmities. By the time
Carlson was decided in 1980, the Bivens remedy had already been
extended to include a remedy under the Fifth Amendment for an
73
equal protection sex discrimination claim against a congressman.
In Carlson, the Court invoked the remedy for an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. The Carlson decision
therefore should be read with the understanding that the Court at
that time anticipated that implied causes of action would extend
74
beyond the Fourth Amendment context.
Yet, as the Bivens progeny developed, the Court became leery of
creating constitutional remedies where Congress either declined to
75
act or created alternative remedies. Three years after Carlson, the
Court refused to find an implied cause of action in a race discrimi76
nation suit against the military and declined to extend the reme77
dy to First Amendment violations. The Court later found no
Bivens remedy for the unconstitutional termination of welfare ben78
efits. Indeed, the Court expressed “caution toward extending
Bivens remedies into any new context, a caution consistently and
79
80
repeatedly recognized for three decades.” In Wilkie v. Robbins,
the Court held that plaintiffs may not seek federal relief where
there exists an alternative remedial mechanism. Thus, in the decades following the Carlson decision, the Court’s jurisprudence belied the axiom that where there is a constitutional wrong, there is a
remedy.
B. Qualified Immunity
Even where the Court found an implied cause of action, the
doctrine of qualified immunity proved a formidable obstacle to
81
achieving the Carlson ideal of constitutional rectification. The
73. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 220, 228–29 (1979).
74. See Hassel, supra note 59, at 478 (“In deciding that Bivens was a superior remedy to
the FTCA, the Court in Carlson apparently anticipated the continued expansion and
strengthening of Bivens claims.”).
75. See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (2012); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537
(2007); Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367
(1983).
76. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
77. Bush, 462 U.S. 367.
78. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). See generally Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74 (declining to find a § 1983 remedy where alternative remedy exists, “including suits in federal
court for injunctive relief”); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 182 (1988) (“[T]he Full
Faith and Credit Clause, in either its constitutional or statutory incarnations, does not give
rise to an implied federal cause of action.”).
79. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74.
80. Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537.
81. See, e.g., Butz v. Economouo, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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Court initially adopted a subjective standard for qualified immunity to strike the proper balance between allowing compensation for
the actions of ill-motived officers while not punishing those who
acted in good faith. Two years after Carlson, however, the Harlow
Court acknowledged the practical difficulties with the subjective
standard—which required a fact-intensive investigation, extensive
discovery, and, too often, a trial—by articulating a new, objective
standard for qualified immunity in an effort to unburden public
officials from expensive and time consuming litigation. Casting
aside the subjective standard, courts would now inquire whether
(1) an official was “performing discretionary functions” and (2)
their actions violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional
82
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
In determining if there is a clearly established constitutional
right, courts examine the factual context of the case to ascertain
whether “every reasonable official would have understood that
83
what he is doing violates that right.” Such factual context of the
legal precedent must be sufficiently specific so that officers are not
confused about whether the legal precedent applies in their par84
ticular circumstances. In other words, the fact that the conduct
85
was unconstitutional must be “beyond debate.” As the Court has
acknowledged, the qualified immunity doctrine protects “all but
86
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
In giving public officers the benefit of the doubt, the doctrine immunizes the defendant and prevents recovery even in instances
87
when the plaintiffs’ rights were violated.
Not only did the legal standard for invoking qualified immunity
change, but so too did the process. Qualified immunity should now
88
be resolved at the “earliest possible stage in litigation.” Once the
immunity is claimed, courts are instructed to resolve the issue before discovery commences in order to unburden defendants from
the slog of litigation, in keeping with the underlying theory of

82. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816, 818 (1982); see also, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna,
136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
83. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093
(2012)).
84. Id. at 308–09
85. Id. at 308 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741(2011)).
86. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 429 (2007) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986)).
87. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614–15 (1999) (holding that presence of media
was a Fourth Amendment violation but nonetheless granting qualified immunity because
the right was not clearly established prior to the ruling).
88. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
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qualified immunity. 89 This protection thwarts all discovery in the
90
case, not just discovery directed at the particular defendant. In
the event that evidence-gathering is needed to judge the immunity
91
defense, the scope of discovery is limited to the immunity issue.
Judgments denying qualified immunity are reviewable through interlocutory appeal, as the pervasiveness of discovery cannot be
92
remedied on appeal after final judgment.
C. Iqbal Pleading Standard
The litigation burdens placed on Bivens defendants was a major
impetus for the Court’s reframing of the Rule 8(a) pleading standard in Iqbal v. Ashcroft. 93 The Court noted that a complaint requires
“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” 94 The Court reasoned that defendants should not be
hauled into court based on threadbare factual allegations. Instead,
the pleading must contain a sufficient factual basis to demonstrate
95
facial plausibility. The standard requires courts to use their “judi96
cial experience and common sense” before “unlock[ing] the
97
doors of discovery.” The Court noted that the concern about disruptive discovery is particularly acute for government officials: “Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the
law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditures of
valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to
98
the proper execution of the work of the Government.”
Despite the Iqbal Court’s admonition of protracted Bivens litigation, the case lingered in the lower courts for eight more years—

89. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511
(1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
90. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2009).
91. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18 (deeming “broad-ranging discovery” to be “peculiarly
disruptive of effective government” until the “threshold immunity question is resolved”); see
also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (requiring specific, nonconclusory facts
to survive a pre-discovery motion to dismiss or summary judgment).
92. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 672–73 (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996)); see
also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741–43 (1982) (allowing interlocutory appeal for
claims of absolute immunity).
93. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (2009).
94. Id. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
95. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level”).
96. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
97. Id. at 678.
98. Id. at 685.
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sixteen years after the events occurred. 99 Then, in the 2017 term,
the Court heard the case for the second time, renamed Ziglar v.
Abbasi. In so doing, the Court took the opportunity to pronounce
its most substantial curtailment of the Bivens remedy.
D. Ziglar v. Abbasi
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) received more than 96,000 tips
from the general public, ranging from substantive suspicions of po100
tential terrorists to unfounded fears of Arabs and Muslims. While
investigating these leads, the FBI encountered many aliens who
were in the country without proper legal authorization. Although
the majority of these illegal aliens were processed according to
standard immigration procedures, eighty-four aliens were subject
to a “hold-until-cleared” policy, meaning they would be detained
101
until they were no longer a person “of interest.” “Of interest” aliens were housed in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing
Unit at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New
102
York.
When the case reached the Supreme Court for the second time,
the remaining defendants were three high-level executive officers
in the Department of Justice and two of the wardens at the Metro103
politan Detention Center. The detainees sued under Bivens alleging Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process, and Equal
Protection violations. The Court reiterated that when Congress
created a statute authorizing money damages against state officials
104
for violations of federal constitutional rights, the legislature declined to create an analogous statute for federal officials. The Abbasi Court emphasized its conservative view towards implied causes
of action, underscoring that separation-of-powers principles preferred that Congress, rather than Judiciary, create a tort system
105
that remedies constitutional infractions. Such judicial restraint is
particularly warranted when deciding a subset of litigation that
embroils public officials in costly discovery and is “used to bring

99. Turkmen v. Aschcroft, 915 F. Supp. 2d 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
100. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1852.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1854.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
105. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856–57.
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about the proper formulation and implementation of public poli106
cies.” The Court found no prior context from which to find an
107
implied cause of action against the executive officials.
While the Abbasi Court’s disapproval of implied causes of action
was not surprising, its test for when such actions are cognizable
went beyond any previous pronouncement. The Court held that,
“[i]f the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens
108
cases decided by this Court, then the context is new.” Without attempting to create an exhaustive list, the Court then used examples to illustrate the types of difference that were significant
enough to create a new context:
the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at
issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the
extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the
statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer
was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence
of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did
109
not consider.
In the event the context is new, lower courts must refrain from
creating a remedy in the event there are “special factors counsel110
ling hesitation.” Although the Court did not provide a declarative definition of the phrase, it guarded against the expansion of
implied rights when Congress has created an alternative remedy to
111
protect the interest at stake or when there are “sound reasons to
think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages
remedy as part of the system for enforcing the law and correcting a
112
wrong.” Notably, the Court emphasized Congress’s decision not
to substitute the United States for the federal employee under the
Westfall Act when an action is brought for a constitutional infrac113
tion. In so doing, the Court underscored the continued schism

106. Id. at 1858.
107. The Court instructed the lower court to perform a special factors analysis regarding
the deliberate indifference claim against the Metropolitan Detention Center’s warden,
Dennis Hasty, to determine whether the claim was a meaningful extension of the remedy
identified in Carlson v. Green. Id. at 1864–65.
108. Id. at 1859.
109. Id. at 1860.
110. Id. at 1857–58.
111. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
112. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.
113. Id. at 1856 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2012)). In Westfall v. Erwin, the Court
held that a federal official’s absolute immunity was limited to situations where the official’s
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between constitutional torts and common-law torts and their corresponding redressability.
The Abbasi case serves as the most restrictive statement to date
on the continuum of cases disfavoring Bivens remedies. The Court
had previously counseled “hesitation before authorizing a new
114
kind of federal litigation.” Still, the exceptional aspect of the decision stems from the fact that “new context” was essentially defined as any suit that even modestly differs from “previous Bivens
cases decided by th[e] Court.” As the Court curtailed the remedy
over the past decades, its precedent leaves only a handful of cases
115
in which the remedy exists. Even where the Court has identified
a constitutional right to be protected through the tort remedy, the
specific facts in a case may nevertheless render it a “new context.”
For example, where the Court found a constitutional remedy for a
Fourth Amendment violation by a lieutenant, such a remedy may
no longer be available if a sergeant perpetrated the same violation.
From a compensatory and accountability standpoint, the rank of
the officer is a distinction without a difference. Yet the Court noted
that “even a modest extension is still an extension” that could render a situation “new” and, therefore, outside the scope of the
116
Bivens remedy. Although the Abbasi Court emphasized that its
decision should not “cast doubt on the continued force, or even
the necessity, of Bivens in the search-and-seizure context in which it
117
arose” and despite the Court’s adherence to Bivens precedent in
the law enforcement context, not all law enforcement cases provide the same context in which to consider whether a Bivens-style
remedy is appropriate. Courts are therefore left to determine
whether a Fourth Amendment violation constitutes a new context.
Some courts have already declined to extend the Bivens remedy in
new contextual cases involving law enforcement activities in which
118
there is an alleged Fourth Amendment violation.

actions were “within the outer perimeter of an official’s duties and . . . discretionary in nature.” 484 U.S. 292, 300 (1988). Congress, however, thought Westfall overreached in limiting
a federal employee’s absolute immunity, so it passed the Westfall Act, amending the FTCA.
See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 566–67 (2003). In passing the legislation, Congress
allowed the United States to substitute itself as the defendant in common-law tort actions
against a federal agent, but not for constitutional torts. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2018).
114. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
115. Constitutional Remedies – Bivens Actions – Ziglar v. Abbasi, supra note 8, at 313 (“If the
Court wants to continue distinguishing Bivens, for the sake of judicial candor and litigative
efficiency it should hold that the Bivens cause of action is limited to the facts of Bivens, Davis,
and Carlson.”).
116. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864.
117. Id. at 1856.
118. Ochoa v. Bratton, No. 16-cv-2852 (JGK), 2017 WL 5900552 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2017)
(no Fifth Amendment claim for property seized by federal law enforcement officers); Jones

SPRING 2019]

Tort Justice Reform

675

Moreover, even though the Abbasi decision focused on the availability of implied causes of actions, the Court has cited its reasoning in the context of qualified immunity to further curtail the efficacy of tort actions against public officials. In District of Columbia v.
Wesby, the Court reiterated that specificity of precedent in finding a
clearly established constitutional right is particularly important in
the Fourth Amendment context. In almost tautological reasoning,
the Court cited the very basis on which to find a new context under
Abbasi as the same basis on which to find qualified immunity in
cases where the context already existed. In the Court’s estimation,
standards, such as probable cause, “turn on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts and cannot be reduced
119
to a neat set of legal rules.” The Court underscored that the
slightest factual distinctions could establish a different context,
thereby immunizing the officers. The Court immunized officers
120
who could have believed their conduct was lawful. Thus, a government actor is shielded from civil liability when “officers of reasonable competence could disagree” on the lawfulness of an action. In such instances, even where a constitutional infraction may
have occurred, the victim is without a remedy and the perpetrator
is deemed immune. Thus, even in the law enforcement context,
the Abbasi decision represents a significant curtailment of the re121
medial regime available through public tort law.
No matter how one views the wisdom of implied actions and the
doctrine of qualified immunity, from a purely compensatory
standpoint, the legal standards and procedural hurdles serve as
substantial impediments to constitutional remedies. Although the
Court’s simultaneous curtailment of implied actions and expansion of qualified immunity has developed over the past several
decades, Ziglar v. Abbasi may yet prove to be the death knell of constitutional tort law.

v. Hernandez, No. 16-CV-1986 W (WVG), 2017 WL 5194636 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2017) (dismissing without prejudice Bivens complaint alleging excessive force by CBP officer); Attkisson v. Holder, No. 1:17-cv-364 (LMB/JFA), 2017 WL 5013230 (E.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2017) (declining to permit Bivens remedy in claim by a reporter alleging unauthorized electronic
surveillance); Perez v. Diaz, No. 13cv1417-WQH-BGS, WL 882229 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2017)
(declining to extend Bivens to excessive force case against aliens attempting to cross the
border).
119. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
120. See, e.g., Olmeda v. Ortiz-Quinonez, 434 F.3d 62, 65 (1st Cir. 2006).
121. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Velez, 864 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2017) (“[P]laintiffs are seeking to extend the Bivens doctrine beyond acceptable limits”); Vanderklok v. United States,
868 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2017) (declining to extend Bivens remedy in First Amendment case
involving airport security screeners); Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017) (declining to extend Bivens remedy to Fifth Amendment claim of discrimination against female
West Point cadet).
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III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FTCA AND BIVENS ACTIONS IN THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT CONTEXT
Legislative action could restore the Bivens remedy to mirror
§ 1983 claims against state actors. Congress can create a statutory
remedy against federal officials for all constitutional infractions,
rather than limiting awards to those contexts previously recognized
by the Court. However, since the doctrine of qualified immunity
evolved in § 1983 actions, concerns about protracted discovery and
diverting government resources nevertheless would persist in a
statutory constitutional tort scheme. Qualified immunity, likewise,
could be addressed through the statutory scheme. But as Congress
has not enacted legislation enabling constitutional tort actions
against federal actors since Bivens, nor has it amended § 1983 to
restructure qualified immunity for state actors, it is far from certain
the legislative branch is discontented with the current state of affairs with respect to actions against public officials.
Neither returning to the pre-Abbasi status quo nor eliminating
the doctrine of qualified immunity will rectify the underlying problems of the Bivens remedy. What is often perceived as a law enforcement violation cannot be adjudicated through the constitutional tort framework. Rather, as more fully explained below, the
more fruitful remedial structure derives from the FTCA. The FTCA
(and state equivalents) has the potential to provide remedies in
circumstances where constitutional and criminal law are silent in
order to deter injurious law enforcement tactics. By focusing on
the legal distinctions between negligence, battery, and excessive
force, this Part argues that common-law tort law has the capacity to
address a broader array of conduct than constitutional tort law in
the area of law enforcement conduct. The reason is twofold. First,
law enforcement privilege law can govern police conduct in a more
restrictive manner than the constitutional framework. Second,
while excessive force jurisprudence focuses on the limited temporal and spatial relationship between the force and the injury,
common-law tort jurisprudence can examine antecedent negligence that proximately causes the injury. Additionally, by focusing
on funds from which the various damages awards are drawn, this
Part dispels the notion that monetary remedies must be levied
against the individual officer in order to deter misconduct. Finally,
this Part will examine the characterization conundrum surrounding common-law tort jurisprudence, as well as the relationship between the law enforcement proviso and the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA.
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The parallel relationship between FTCA and Bivens claims is a
byproduct of the coterminous symmetry between constitutional
and common-law tort jurisprudence. Bivens actions were initially
conceived as a necessary compensatory mechanism because state
tort law failed to provide an adequate safeguard for constitutional
infractions. Justice Brennan reasoned that state tort law and constitutional law were not perfectly harmonious; indeed, the interests
protected by state law and the Fourth Amendment “may be incon122
sistent or even hostile.”
Certain allegations of constitutional violations outside of the
Fourth Amendment, such as under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and
Ninth Amendments, often do not have common-law equivalents. A
First Amendment chill on the freedom of speech and assembly of123
ten does not have a common-law tort analogue. Nor does the
124
denial of due process as a result of discrimination. Some torts
that are cognizable both in constitutional and common law, such
as libel and slander (alleged to interfere with the First Amendment
right of speech), are not cognizable under the intentional tort ex125
ception to the FTCA. At the same time, the Supreme Court has
126
warned lower courts to not “constitutionalize” common-law torts:
“Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the governors
and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional
tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for in127
juries that attend living together in society.”
Within the Fourth Amendment context, however, there exists a
more symbiotic relationship between officer misconduct and tradi128
tional common-law jurisprudence. For example, many constitutional tort lawsuits against individual federal and state law enforcement officers arise from allegations of excessive force. With
respect to police officers’ use of force, the constitutional standard
129
derives from a line of cases, including Tennessee v. Garner, Graham

122. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971).
123. Joint Hearing on Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 18, at 137 (letter
from Department of Justice to Subcommittee recognizing analytical distinction).
124. Id.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018). See generally Joint Hearing on Amendments to the Federal
Tort Claims Act, supra note 18, at 137.
126. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”).
127. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
128. Cf. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 935 (Cal. 1999) (acknowledging the community
caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment because “[i]t would be anomalous to deny a
police officer charged with protecting the citizenry a privilege accorded to every other individual who intercedes to aid or to protect another’s property”).
129. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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v. Connor, 130 and most recently in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez.131
The excessive force line of cases underscore the limited context in
which constitutional infractions provide the basis for a tort remedy.
In cases alleging both Fourth Amendment violations and commonlaw tort claims (assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment,
and negligence), it is often the latter that provides greater remedial relief. Efforts to harness such common-law tort judgments in order to effectuate institutional change may ultimately provide a
more fruitful avenue for reform.
A. Constitutional Standards vs. Statutory Privileges
On the evening of October 3, 1974, two Memphis police officers
132
responded to a “prowler inside call.” When they arrived on scene, a woman was standing on her porch and notified the officers
that the break-in was occurring next door. One of the officers then
went to the back of the neighboring home. He discovered the fleeing suspect, Edward Garner. Garner was crouched at the base of a
six-foot-high chain link fence enclosing the backyard. The officer
was able to see Garner’s face and hands and, although he could
not be certain, was “reasonably sure” Garner was unarmed. The officer shouted “police, halt” and took steps towards Garner. Garner
began climbing the fence. Believing Garner would escape if he
made it over the fence, the officer fatally shot him in the back of
the head.
At that time, the governing Tennessee statute permitted the
shooting. The statute read, “[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may
133
use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.” The Memphis
Police Department policy likewise permitted the use of deadly
force in cases of burglary. Neither the Memphis Police Firearm’s
134
Review Board nor a grand jury found fault with the shooting.
Garner’s father then brought a civil action, alleging violations of
his son’s constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
shooting, and implicitly the statute, was constitutional. The Court
clarified that apprehension by use of deadly force is necessarily a
seizure and, consequently, must be evaluated pursuant to the

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989).
137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).
Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.
Id. at 4–5 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN § 40-7-108 (1982)).
Id. at 5.
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Fourth Amendment. In so doing, the Court reiterated that the
Fourth Amendment analysis “must balance the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
135
justify the intrusion.” That balancing analysis centers on “whether the totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of
136
search or seizure.”
Applying that analytical framework, the Court concluded that it
137
was unconstitutional to use deadly force to apprehend Garner.
The majority recognized the governmental interest in effective law
enforcement and preventing felons from successfully fleeing capture and avoiding prosecution. Nonetheless, those interests could
not outweigh “[t]he suspect’s fundamental interest in his own
138
life . . . .” The Court reasoned that “[w]here the suspect poses no
immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm
resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of
139
deadly force to do so.” The majority further acknowledged that
statutes permitting the use of deadly force to apprehend felons, as
in Tennessee, were ubiquitous when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted. However, such statutes had largely fallen out of favor by
the time of the Garner decision, as social science had raised substantial concerns surrounding the theory that deadly force serves as
a deterrent for escape attempts.
In her dissent, Justice O’Connor expressed sympathy for the
“tragic and unfortunate” outcome of the case. Still, the Justice
raised concerns about relying on evolving police procedures to articulate constitutional lines. The dissent balked at using social science and shifting notions of best practices to establish constitutional barriers:
There is no question that the effectiveness of police use of
deadly force is arguable and that many States or individual
police departments have decided not to authorize it in circumstances similar to those presented here. But it should
go without saying that the effectiveness or popularity of a

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
Id. at 8–9.
See id. at 3–5.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
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particular police practice does not determine its constitu140
tionality.
Tennessee v. Garner not only demonstrates the constitutional limits of permissible police force but underscores the potential for
state privilege law to delineate favorable behavior. Privilege is an
affirmative defense asserted to justify conduct that ordinarily may
constitute a tort, but under particular circumstances does not sub141
ject the perpetrator to liability. For example, the force necessary
to effectuate an arrest would typically constitute an assault or battery, as well as false imprisonment. But, “[w]here a privilege to arrest exists, it justifies not only the confinement but also any con142
duct which is reasonably necessary to effect the arrest.” Thus,
when an officer uses force that would typically constitute a battery
if exerted by a private individual, the conduct may be privileged,
143
thereby preventing recovery by the plaintiff.
Still, law enforcement officers are not afforded absolute immunity when they use force during a legally valid arrest. State tort law
recognizes that the amount of force used by a law enforcement of144
ficer must be reasonable under the circumstances. When force
exceeds reasonableness, it is no longer privileged, and may not
145
serve as a defense against the claim of an intentional tort.
Like most state ordinances when Garner was decided, the Tennessee Criminal Code prohibited the use of force to stop a fleeing
misdemeanant, but permitted officers to use “all the necessary
means to effect the arrest” in the event a felon attempted to flee or

140. Id. at 28; cf. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) (“The Eighth Amendment
is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters
over how best to administer its criminal laws.”).
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
142. Id. § 118 cmt. b.
143. See id. § 890.
144. Most jurisdictions examine force used by law enforcement officers as privileged
conduct, which serves as an affirmative defense. The burden is on the defendant to prove
the reasonableness of the otherwise tortious conduct. However, a minority of jurisdictions
assume officers act lawfully and place the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the force. See, e.g., Wall v. Zeeb, 153 N.W.2d 779, 786 (N.D. 1967) (“[T]he
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove that . . . the police officer[] used unnecessary
or unreasonable force.”).
145. See, e.g., Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 40 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff alleges
both § 1983 excessive force claim and common-law claims for assault and battery, the determination of reasonableness of the force used under § 1983 controls the determination of
the reasonableness of the force under the common-law assault and battery claims.”) (quoted
with approval in Niles v. Town of Wakefield, 172 F. Supp. 3d 429, 445 (D. Mass. 2016)); Topolski v. Cottrell, No. 5:11-CV-1216, 2012 WL 3264927, at *3 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 9, 2012) (“Assault and battery claims under New York law are analogous to excessive force claims under
the Fourth Amendment.”); Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, When Does Police Officer’s Use Of
Force During Arrest Become So Excessive As To Constitute Violation Of Constitutional Rights, Imposing
Liability Under Federal Civil Rights Acts of 1871 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983), 60 A.L.R. Fed. 204 (1982).
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forcibly resist. 146 Tennessee was in keeping with the common-law
147
rule. The Restatement (Second) of Torts negates the conditional
privilege for officers when the means employed are “in excess of
148
those which the actor reasonably believes to be necessary.” As a
general proposition, the Restatement appears to mirror the rea149
sonableness standard ingrained in Fourth Amendment case law.
However, the Restatement had been interpreted as permitting police officers to use deadly force during a felony arrest when such
150
force is necessary to effect the arrest.
Although such deadly-force statutes had not yet been deemed
unconstitutional when the Court decided Garner, many states had
taken it upon themselves to craft statutes that provided their citizens with greater protections. As noted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court around the time of Garner decision, “[a]lthough the courts
have overwhelmingly favored the common-law rule, commentators,
law reformers, police department administrators, and legislatures
increasingly tend to favor the more restrictive rule as to the scope
151
of the privilege.” Eighteen states allowed for the use of deadly
force “only if the suspect has committed a felony involving the use
or threat of physical or deadly force, or is escaping with a deadly
weapon, or is likely to endanger life or inflict serious physical inju152
ry if not arrested.” States began forbidding the use of deadly
153
force for any reason but to prevent violent felonies. In those
states, the use of deadly force upon a fleeing felon would not have
been privileged, and any officer who used such force would have
committed a battery. Thus, before the Court articulated the constitutional prohibition on using deadly force against fleeing felons,
states were using their privilege law to afford their citizens greater
154
protection and to hold their officers more accountable.

146. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4–5, 5 n.5 (1985) (citing TENN. CODE ANN § 407-108 (1982)).
147. See id. at 12 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 132 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also, e.g., Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N.W.2d 525, 534 (Minn. 1976) (In a battery and negligence action
based on officer using deadly force against fleeing felon, the court acknowledged that “the
Restatement is intended to describe what the law is, not what the law should be.”).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 132 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“[T]he actor
is privileged to use a means of effecting an arrest which is intended or likely to cause death
if the offense for which the arrest is sought is of the serious character described in that Section.”)
150. See Shafer, supra note 145.
151. Schumann, 240 N.W.2d at 535.
152. Garner, 471 U.S. at 17.
153. Id.
154. See generally Garner, 471 U.S. at 28 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he effectiveness or popularity of a particular police practice does not determine its constitutionality.”); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) (“The Eighth Amendment is not violated
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Rather than relying on constitutional decisions, tort law can invoke developing national practices and best practices to determine
the proper standard of care in various scenarios. Tort law can
strike the proper balance between the constitutional floor and the
aspirational goals of states that aim to further curtail law enforcement overreach. As Justice Brennan once noted, “[t]he legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—for
without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaran155
teed.” As states tailor their criminal codes to meet the unique
challenges of their community, there should be an emphasis on
the manner in which privilege law shapes law enforcement conduct.
Of course, this potential reform avenue is available only to the
states. At the federal level, the extent to which the United States
can be held liable in tort for conduct that may be privileged at the
state level raises two intersecting issues of statutory interpretation:
first, the FTCA private person analogue for law enforcement conduct and, second, the substantive law, including privileges, under
which such cases should be adjudicated. Under the FTCA “private
person analogue,” courts must draw from like circumstances in
156
which private citizens engaged in the type of conduct at issue. In
United States v. Olson, the Court reiterated that the statute must be
read in its plain language: “namely, that the United States waives
sovereign immunity ‘under circumstances’ where the local law
157
would make a ‘private person’ liable in tort.” Whether state law
imposes liability on state or municipal entities is irrelevant to the
sovereign immunity waiver; rather, the only relevant inquiry is
whether private citizens in similar circumstances can be held lia158
ble. The government cannot escape liability simply by arguing
that the conduct at issue was uniquely governmental in nature. Ra159
ther, courts must “look further afield” for private analogues, in160
cluding Good Samaritan laws.

every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best
to administer its criminal laws.”).
155. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
156. United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 46 (2005).
157. Id. at 44.
158. Id. at 47–48.
159. Id. at 46.
160. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (rejecting argument that
no analogue exists for uniquely governmental functions and instead looking to Good Samaritan law for operation of a lighthouse by the Coast Guard). See generally Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950) (“The relationship between the Government and members
of its armed forces is ‘distinctively federal in character.’”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL

SPRING 2019]

Tort Justice Reform

683

Although finding a private person analogue for claims of negligence is in keeping with the traditional notion of the FTCA as a
compensatory mechanism, identifying analogous behavior in the
law enforcement context, particularly where privileges are delineated specifically for police officers, often proves more problematic.
The law enforcement proviso to the intentional tort exception to
the FTCA would be nullified if the court were unable to find private analogues for federal law enforcement conduct. As the proviso
was intended to allow for tort actions based on law enforcement
conduct, the government cannot escape liability based on such circular reasoning that the lack of a private person analogue negates
161
the proviso. The Court has clarified that “under like circumstances”
162
does not mean under “the same circumstances.” Still, for cases arising from law enforcement conduct unique to the federal government, such as immigration detention claims, courts are divided on
163
whether the United States has waived sovereign immunity.
Equally disconcerting, even when courts are able to divine a private person analogue such as equating law enforcement conduct to
citizen’s arrests, courts often employ the supposedly analogous
state tort substantive law as the proper legal framework through
164
which to judge federal law enforcement actions. That analysis
conflates the private person analogue with the issue of privilege
165
law. For example, most citizen’s arrests are privileged only when

JURISDICTION 674–75 (Wolters Kluwer 7th ed. 2016) (“Interestingly, the Court’s explanation
[for the Feres doctrine] has shifted over time. Originally, in Feres, the Court emphasized that
the government could be held liable under the [FTCA] only for activities that also are undertaken by private entities . . . . But . . . the Supreme Court expressly discarded this limitation on recovery under the act [in Indian Towing and Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
31 (1957)], permitting suits even for activities done solely by the federal government . . . .
Subsequent to the Feres decision, the Court began emphasizing a different rationale for precluding recovery for injuries received incident to military service: the need to preserve military discipline.”).
161. See generally Stanton R. Gallegos, Are Police People Too? An Examination of the Federal
Tort Claims Act’s “Private Person” Standard as it Applied to Federal Law Enforcement Activities, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 775 (2011).
162. Olson, 546 U.S. at 46 (emphasis in original).
163. Compare Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding a private analogue through false imprisonment), with Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 502 (9th Cir.
1995) (Ferguson, J. dissenting) (citing Woodbridge Plaza v. Bank of Irvine, 815 F.2d 538,
543 (9th Cir. 1987), to suggest no private analogue exists), and Lippman v. City of Miami,
622 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (finding no private person analogue under Florida law).
164. See Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007) (plurality opinion); see also
Liranzo, 690 F.3d 78; Mayorov v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 3d 678 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Watson v.
United States, 133 F. Supp. 3d 502 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). But see Tekle, 511 F.3d at 857 (plurality
opinion) (refusing to read Olson “to support the conclusion that the law enforcement privileges should not be recognized in FTCA suits, and that federal officers are left only with
those privileges available to private citizens”).
165. Liranzo, 690 F.3d at 92–93 (reading a prior immigration hearing case as being “a
case about the substantive standard by which immigration officers’ acts are to be judged—
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the arrest is correct in fact. 166 The analogue does not withstand
scrutiny when officers perform certain law enforcement tasks, such
167
as effectuating search warrants, performing Terry stops, or detain168
ing potential illegal immigrants at the border.
Some courts engage in legal gymnastics by reasoning that state
substantive law has incorporated federal standards for the performance of uniquely federal law enforcement functions and, consequently, assess the reasonableness of officer conduct through the
169
prism of federal law enforcement privileges. This approach reconciles the dueling private person analogue and state law provisions by merely citing citizen’s arrest jurisprudence as a threshold
recognition of a parallel universe of private activity before adjudi170
cating the merits pursuant to relevant privileges. Such privileges
171
are assessed under federal law.
Establishing uniformity of privileged federal law enforcement
conduct would not merely insulate the officers by having their actions adjudged based on federal standards. It would also prevent
courts from dismissing actions pursuant to state law based on con172
duct that would be actionable at the federal level. For example,
not about the presence or absence of a private analogue”); Rhoden v. United States, 55 F.3d
428, 431 (9th Cir. 1995).
166. See, e.g., White v. Albany Med Ctr. Hosp., 542 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989)
(“In New York, a private citizen who makes an arrest does so at his peril; if the person arrested did not in fact commit the crime for which he is arrested, the person who arrests him
is liable even if he acts in good faith or has probable cause to make an arrest.”).
167. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
168. See, e.g., Munyua v. United States, No. C-03-04538 EDL, 2005 WL 43960, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 10, 2005) (“The fact that the challenged activities took place at the border does not
negate the analogy to law enforcement . . . .”); Boger et al., supra note 52, at 521 (“Such a
variegated pattern of culpability may make sense in the context of negligent tort recovery,
but its rationale in suits against law enforcement officials for intentional torts seems unjustified. The amendment seeks to establish a standard of appropriate conduct for all federal
officials who are charged with the responsibility for ensuring constitutional rights. To make
this demonstrably federal standard dependent upon state law turns the liability question on
its head.”).
169. See, e.g., Caban v. United States (Caban II), 728 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1984); see also
Liranzo, 690 F.3d at 92–93 (“But other courts have—in our view correctly—read Caban II as a
case about the substantive standard by which immigration officers’ acts are to be judged—
not about the presence or absence of a private analogue.”).
170. See Liranzo, 690 F.3d at 96 (“The fact that New York law applies different substantive
standards to citizens’ and officers’ arrests . . . is also of no significance for present purposes
because, under Caban II—which provides the law of this Circuit—immigration detentions
executed by federal immigration officers are judged under federal standards . . . .”) (internal citation omitted).
171. See Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California law to FTCA claims for false arrest and false imprisonment by customs agents, but
federal law for determining probable cause).
172. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971) (“For just as state law may not authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth
Amendment, neither may state law undertake to limit the extent to which federal authority
can be exercised. The inevitable consequence of this dual limitation on state power is that
the federal question becomes not merely a possible defense to the state law action, but an
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in Washington v. DEA, 173 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents broke down the Washingtons’ front door using a battering
ram, entered the home with their weapons drawn, and threatened
to shoot the seventy-two-year-old Mr. Washington if he disobeyed
their orders. The couple was detained while the agents conducted
a thorough search of the house. The search failed to uncover any
narcotics or drug paraphernalia. While assessing the plaintiffs’
FTCA claims for assault and battery, the Eighth Circuit applied
Missouri law to conclude that “while this show of force may have
intimidated the [Washingtons] and offended their sensibilities, it
174
was not unreasonable under the circumstances.” The damages in
Washington v. DEA were nearly identical to the Collinsville raids
that led to the enactment of the law enforcement proviso under
the FTCA. Still, the Eighth Circuit found that the conduct was privileged under state substantive law.
Short of enacting federal tort law, an amendment to the FTCA
should clarify that no precise private person analogue is necessary
for law enforcement activity. Claims based on such conduct are
cognizable under the FTCA. At the same time, the conduct of federal law enforcement officers must be judged based on federal
175
privileges, including departmental policies and guidelines. Although certain claims would continue to be brought based on
common-law jurisprudence, if constitutional and statutory tort law
were folded into the FTCA, adjudications would become more
streamlined by examining conduct through the proper federal laws
and privileges. For example, in Washington, the common-law tort

independent claim both necessary and sufficient to make out the plaintiff’s cause of action.”) (internal citations omitted).
173. Washington v. DEA, 183 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 1999).
174. Id.; see also Casillas v. United States, No. CV 07-395-TUC-DCB (HCE), 2009 WL
735193, at *17 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2009) (“Although the SWAT-style manner of execution of
the search herein was undoubtedly shocking and frightening to Plaintiffs, there are no allegations that the officers used excessive force or improper tactics in conducting the search
such that the officers’ conduct was outside the scope of public policy concerns at issue under the given circumstances.”).
175. Due to the FTCA private person analogue requirement, liability currently cannot be
imposed based on the breach of a federal statute or regulation. It can only be based on a
negligence standard devised by the state common law. See, e.g., McGowan v. United States,
825 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2016) (dismissing FTCA claim because plaintiff relied solely on
allegations “that the BOP negligently failed to follow its own disciplinary regulations”);
United States v. Agronics, Inc., 164 F.3d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir. 1999) (“It is virtually axiomatic that the FTCA does not apply ‘where the claimed negligence arises out of the failure of
the United States to carry out a [federal] statutory duty in the conduct of its own affairs.’”)
(quoting Sea Air Shuttle Corp. v. United States, 112 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 1997)); Johnson
v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 727 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“[T]he FTCA requires that the duty
breached by the government employee be not simply one imposed by federal statute or regulation, but rather arise under state law. This requirement for a breach of state law duty is
not met simply by invoking general state law principles of respondeat superior or failure to supervise.”).
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claims based on the conduct of the DEA agents would be judged
based on 21 U.S.C. § 878, the statute outlining the arrest authority
of DEA enforcement personnel. U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers’ conduct would be judged, not under state privilege
law, but pursuant to the federal statutes and regulations that reflect
the plenary authority of the Executive to conduct routine searches
176
and seizures at the border. Provided the statute was facially constitutional, it would delineate the standard of care for FTCA claims
sounding in both common-law and constitutional torts. If the conduct was wrongful, the question would become whether such conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation, constituted an
intentional tort, or was merely substandard. That analysis would
largely center on the characterization of the conduct.
B. Excessive Force vs. Antecedent Negligence
Although the outcome of the Garner decision seems unassailable
by today’s policing standards, the dissenting opinion provided significant fodder against broader Fourth Amendment critiques of
police tactics. In her dissent, Justice O’Connor cautioned against
judicial second-guessing of police officers when they are confronted with volatile and dangerous situations: “The clarity of hindsight
cannot provide the standard for judging the reasonableness of police decisions made in uncertain and often dangerous circumstances.” Justice O’Connor emphasized “the difficult, split-second
177
decisions police officers must make in these circumstances.” Although the majority was successful in striking down the Tennessee
statute, this dissenting language served as a prevailing factor in the
Court’s subsequent excessive-force jurisprudence.
178
In Graham v. Connor, the Court articulated a balancing test that
focuses the excessive-force inquiry on the officer’s objective reasonableness at the moment they exerted force. The Court rejected
the premise that the officer’s subjective intent should govern the
analysis, such as whether the officer acted “maliciously and sadistically.” The Court held that a subjective inquiry was irrelevant and
reiterated that the focus must be on whether the use of force was
objectively reasonable. Before remanding for reconsideration consistent with the objective standard, the Court reiterated that claims

176. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004); see 19 U.S.C. §§ 482,
1461, 1499, 1581, 1582 (2018); 6 U.S.C. § 211 (2018); 8 C.F.R. pt. 287 (2003); 19 C.F.R. pt.
162 (1972).
177. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 24 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
178. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment require a careful
balancing between the intrusive nature of the force and the government’s interest in effectuating the seizure. In articulating the
totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Court revived the concerns
first articulated in Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Garner.
The Court emphasized that officers must be afforded deference
when making quick decisions during precarious confrontations:
“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particu179
lar situation.”
As many scholars have written, the Graham decision is noteworthy not merely for articulating the objective reasonableness test,
but for delineating a muddled totality-of-the-circumstances analytical framework. The Court listed several factors that play into the
inquiry, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
180
evade arrest by flight.” Although the list was certainly not meant
to be exhaustive, the absence of one particular factor has been a
source of significant debate: the temporal and spatial relationship
181
between the exertion of force and the injury. The Court chose
merely to highlight the split-second judgments officers often face
without grappling with the question of whether the conduct preceding such judgments should factor into the analysis.
Absent a clear answer from the Court, lower courts and lawyers
have been left to grapple with the issue. Seizing on the “splitsecond judgment” language, many courts ignore the events leading
to a shooting and focus their constitutional inquiry on whether the
officer acted reasonably at the precise moment they exerted
182
force. As one scholar wrote,
179. Id. at 396–97.
180. Id. at 396.
181. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. L. REV. 1119,
1131 (2008) (“Timing is crucial to any meaningful account of what is reasonable force. If a
threat to the officer or a state interest has not yet manifested itself, no force is justified. If
force occurs after the threat terminates, it is excessive regardless of what took place before
it. Although two of the four Graham factors imply that timing may be relevant . . . Graham’s
vague ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach falls critically short in addressing this crucial
matter because it suggests that timing is one factor to be considered among many, when it is
often simply dispositive.”).
182. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 12, at 285–86 (“The Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment doctrine exerts real pull on these police policies. About half of the policies relied upon the language from Graham and the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases
when setting out their general requirements for the use of force. The policies often paraphrase Graham to say that reasonableness of force must be assessed based on the ‘totality of
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[s]ince the Supreme Court first introduced that description
in 1989, federal district and circuit courts have repeated it
on more than 2,300 occasions. It features widely in briefs
and trial court documents and had made its way into federal and state pattern jury instructions. It is, by any measure,
the accepted depiction of the environment in which police
183
officers use force.
By articulating a balancing test that focuses predominantly on
the moment in which the officer exerts force, the Court left open
the question of the extent to which preceding conduct should influence the constitutional analysis.
The extent to which preceding conduct factors into the Bivens
analysis underscores the distinction between constitutional doctrine and traditional tort law. A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs
“only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of
184
movement through means intentionally applied.” As the Constitution
185
guards against “misuse of power,” seizures perpetrated by gov186
ernment officials must derive from intentional or willful conduct.
Fourth Amendment excessive force jurisprudence necessitates a
187
“temporal perspective of the inquiry.” Even when officers engage
in a car chase for several miles, lasting several minutes, their conduct is only considered a seizure at the moment the officers intend
188
to make contact with the suspect’s vehicle. Indeed, the temporalspatial analysis between the wrongful conduct and the injury is often critical to prevent Fourth Amendment exceptions to the war189
rant requirement from extending beyond their legal limits.

the circumstances’ known to the officer, who must make a split-second decision. Only departments that adopt a minimization or a de-escalation approach include additional factors
and otherwise qualify the ‘split-second approach’ drawn from the constitutional case law.”);
see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 777 (2014) (assessing threat “at the moment when
the shots were fired”); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (denoting the “temporal
perspective of the inquiry”); id. at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The proper perspective
in judging an excessive force claims, Graham explained, is that of ‘a reasonable officer on
the scene’ and ‘at the moment’ force was employed.”).
183. Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 865 (2014).
184. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis added).
185. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (quoted with approval in Brower, 489
U.S. at 596).
186. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (“A seizure occurs even when an unintended person or
thing is the object of the detention or taking, but the detention of taking itself must be willful.”) (citations omitted).
187. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206.
188. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375 (2007).
189. E.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (recognizing that allowing officers to
search a vehicle pursuant to the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine once the driver had already been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car would extend the legal fiction
past its breaking point).
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Analogous to the willfulness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, assault and battery necessitate a showing of intent,
such that a plaintiff must show that the officer acted with the purpose of producing the consequence or acted with the understand190
ing that the consequence was substantially certain to result. In
cases where the actor desired to cause the very harm produced,
courts have little difficulty characterizing the conduct as an intentional tort. Where a police officer desires to shoot a fleeing misdemeanant and does so, the requisite intent has been established
for claims of both excessive force and battery.
Mere negligent governmental conduct, on the other hand, can191
not constitute a constitutional violation. Negligence is typically
defined as a breach of a legal duty that proximately causes an inju192
ry. In distinguishing between constitutional violations and mere
negligence, the Supreme Court has reiterated:
Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no
more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct
is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of
193
due process of law.
The general tort rule is that a defendant can “be held liable only
for harm that was among the potential harms—the risk—that
194
made the actor’s conduct tortious.” Liability attaches to one who
sets in motion a chain of events in which “the danger of an intervening negligent or criminal act should have been reasonably an195
ticipated and protected against.” Constitutional tort law likewise
renders defendants liable only for the foreseeable consequences of
196
their actions. Even when an intervening act is the immediate
trigger for the injury, the defendant’s conduct may still be the
proximate cause of the injury if the intervening act was a foreseea190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
191. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause is
simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to
life, liberty or property.”) (emphasis in original). See generally Davidson v. O’Lone, 752 F.2d
817 (3d Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“Various other courts since [Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981),] have also agreed that simple negligence does not suffice to state a claim under §
1983.”), aff’d sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
193. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“Medical
malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”).
194. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
195. Hall v. District of Columbia, 867 F.3d 138, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
196. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986).
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ble consequence of the initial conduct. 197 On the other hand, when
the intervening act is so extraordinary that it was not reasonably
foreseeable, it is said to be a superseding cause that breaks the
causal link between the initial conduct and the injury. Among the
factors to consider in determining whether a subsequent act is an
intervening or superseding cause are whether the force “is operating independently of any situation created by the actor’s negli198
gence, or . . . is or is not a normal result of such a situation.”
The difficulty in properly characterizing conduct as either intentional or negligent is often personified in the surgeon who exceeds
199
the scope of his or her patient’s consent. When the patient gives
consent for the procedure (a form of privilege law), and the surgeon accurately performs the procedure (for example, removes
the gangrenous leg), it is neither a battery nor negligence. However, in instances when consent for the procedure is granted, should
the surgeon incorrectly execute the procedure (for example, by
removing the wrong leg), courts agree that a tort has been committed. The characterization of that tort, however, remains somewhat contentious. Under traditional tort theory, the botched sur200
The surgeon intended to make
gery constituted a battery.
contact, and the fact that she did not intend for the contact to be
harmful or offensive is irrelevant. However, modern tort law recognizes that the surgeon did not intend to harm or offend the pa201
tient. Yet, the latter analysis is not complete. Although it is evident that the surgeon acted intentionally in the sense that she
intended to remove the leg, courts tend to treat the case as one
sounding in negligence, suggesting that the surgeon acted unreasonably by believing she was privileged to take such action. Surgeons who unreasonably exceeded the bounds of consent or intentionally act based on a substandard perception of fact are often
202
liable for medical malpractice.

197. See, e.g., Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 609 (6th Cir.
2007).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
199. See generally Kenneth Simon, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1061, 1067–68 (2006) (suggesting that medical battery cases where the surgeon did not
knowingly exceed consent are “impossible to explain under dual intent rule”); Stephen D.
Sugarman, Restating the Tort of Battery, 10 J. TORT L. 197 (2017) (calling for the merging of
the battery and negligence into a single new tort in order to resolve the confusion).
200. See Moos v. United States, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955) (dismissing an FTCA action
under the intentional tort exception when VA surgeon operated on the wrong leg).
201. See Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983) (declining to find a
battery where the surgeon grabbed a patient without intending to cause harmful contact).
202. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 31, § 35 (“Even if the jury believes that the defendant had
no intent to offend, it might find him to be negligent and liable on the grounds if he causes
actual harm.”).
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This analytical distinction is often difficult to parse when assessing law enforcement officials’ conduct that leads to physical
confrontation. Wrongful conduct that precedes an injury can con203
stitute excessive force. In Brower v. County of Inyo, the Court held
that the erection of a police roadblock can constitute a Fourth
Amendment seizure even though the injury occurred subsequent
to the wrongful intentional action. The determinative factor was
whether the officers possessed the requisite intent to effectuate the
204
stop at the time of their conduct. Any intervening act by the suspect must have been a reasonably anticipated response to the initial conduct. Provided that an officer acts intentionally, and that
intentional conduct leads to the reasonably anticipated intervening
act, constitutional tort actions are permissible. Thus, courts have
held that an officer may not leap in front of a car, without leaving
the suspect time to stop the car, and then justify the oncoming
205
threat as justification to use deadly force. Nor may an officer intentionally release an animal upon a surrendering suspect, then
cite the fact that the suspect lowered his hands to justify the use of
force. 206
Those cases, however, depend upon a finding that the antecedent conduct was intentional or performed with deliberate indiffer207
208
ence. Such intentionality is not always so easy to determine. For
example, in Young v. City of Killeen, Texas, an officer killed a suspected drug dealer, Young, when he reached towards the floor209
board of his vehicle. At trial, the police procedure expert testified that the officer’s conduct was inconsistent with standard
practices in numerous ways:
203. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. at 598–99 (1989) (finding a “seizure” under
the Fourth Amendment when officers erected a roadblock well before the suspect crashed
into it).
204. If the officers did not intend to restrain the suspect, but instead accidentally pinned
him against the wall due to negligence, “it is likely that a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” See id. at 596.
205. Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Sample v. Bailey, 409
F.3d 689, 697 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding objective unreasonableness where officer ordered
suspect out of a closet then used his movements to justify force).
206. Kopf v. Wing, 942 F.2d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 1991) (“We believe that a jury could find
it objectively unreasonable to require someone to put his hands up and calmly surrender
while a police dog bites his scrotum.”); see also Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t,
806 F.3d 268, 286–88 (5th Cir. 2015) (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Sample, 409 F.3d at 697.
207. See, e.g., Mason, 806 F.3d at 286 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disbelieving testimony that the release of the dog was accidental).
208. Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controversy, 61
AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1588 (2012); see e.g., Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995) (requiring only “the intent to make contact with the person, not the intent to cause harm”). See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 101 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1,
2015).
209. 775 F.2d 1349, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985).
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(1) failure to use his radio; (2) failure to utilize a back-up
unit; (3) dangerous placement of his patrol car in a “cutoff” maneuver; (4) ordering the two men to exit their car
rather than issuing an immobilization command to remain
in the car with their hands in plain view; (5) increasing the
risk of an incident by having two suspects getting out of a
car; [and] (6) abandoning a covered position and advancing into the open, where the odds of overacting would be
210
greater.
The district court found Officer Olson liable on both constitutional and state tort grounds. The court reasoned that the officer acted
negligently by creating a danger that “not only placed [himself] in
a position of greater danger but also imperiled Young by creating a
211
situation where a fatal error was likely.” Moreover, the officer violated Young’s constitutional rights by using excessive force. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court with respect to the
civil rights claim because the lower court’s “findings and conclusions demonstrate that the judge found fault only with the way the
officer stopped and confronted Young and not with the shooting
itself.” Rather, “[t]he only fault against [the officer] was his negligence in creating a situation where the danger of such a mistake
would exist. We hold that no right is guaranteed by federal law that
one will be free from circumstances where he will be endangered
212
by the misinterpretation of his acts.” Although the Fifth Circuit
reversed the constitutional decision, it nonetheless affirmed the
lower court’s negligence ruling because the officer violated police
procedures, thereby creating a danger of foreseeable harm. In
other words, while the preceding conduct was not sufficiently intentional to warrant a constitutional remedy, the antecedent negligence was nonetheless redressable under traditional tort law. The
distinction “is necessary to avoid collapse of the jurisprudence of
213
deadly force into a negligence action.”
The Supreme Court weighed in on how to assess antecedent
conduct that proximately caused a police shooting in County of Los
214
Angeles v. Mendez. Deputies from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department received a tip that an armed and dangerous paroleeat-large, Ronnie O’Dell, was possibly living at a home in Lancaster,

210. Id.
211. Id. at 1352–53.
212. Id. at 1353.
213. Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 286 (5th Cir. 2015) (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).
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California. The sheriff’s department devised a plan to apprehend
O’Dell at the residence that included sending officers to approach
the house from both the front and rear. During the briefing, the
officers learned that a couple, including a pregnant woman, was
living in the backyard of the home. Upon approaching the home,
three officers knocked on the front door while Deputies Conley
and Pederson went to the back of the property. The two deputies
searched the backyard, which “included three metal storage sheds
and a one-room shack made of wood and plywood.” The couple living in the backyard had built the shack and kept a BB rifle to use
on rats and other pests. The BB gun resembled a small caliber ri215
fle.
When the deputies opened the door to the shed, the couple
awoke from a nap. The man thought it was the owner of the home
and picked up the BB gun so he could stand up and place it on the
floor. Upon seeing the BB gun, Deputy Conley yelled “Gun!” and
the officer discharged fifteen rounds. The couple suffered severe
injuries, including an amputation of the man’s leg.
The couple brought an action against the individual officers,
claiming three separate Fourth Amendment violations. First, the
couple alleged that the deputies performed an unconstitutional
search by entering the shack without a warrant. Second, they asserted that the deputies’ failure to announce their presence before
entering constituted an unreasonable search. Third, the couple
claimed the officers used excessive force upon entering the shack.
The district court found the deputies liable on both the warrantless search and the knock-and-announce claims. Pursuant to Graham v. Connor, however, the lower court found that the two officers
did not use excessive force because the act of pointing the BB gun
was a superseding factor. The deputies reasonably believed “that a
216
man was holding a firearm rifle threatening their lives.” The circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate
panel affirmed the warrantless search liability but concluded that
the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity for failing to
knock on the shed and announce their presence. The court did
not disagree with the lower court’s determination that the shooting was reasonable under Graham. Still, the inquiry was not complete.
Given that the warrantless search was unconstitutional but the
subsequent shooting was constitutional, the question was whether
the deputies could be held liable for the couple’s physical injuries.

215.
216.

Id. at 1544.
See id. at 1545 (internal quotation omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit answered in the affirmative under its “provocation rule” doctrine. The rule permitted a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim “where an officer intentionally or recklessly
provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an inde217
pendent Fourth Amendment violation.” Under the rule, even
when force is justified under Graham, an excessive force claim is
permissible if the officer committed an independent violation of
the Fourth Amendment in the course of events leading up to the
seizure.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the provocation rule.
Justice Alito reasoned that the rule effectively transformed a reasonable use of force into an unreasonable use of force based upon
a separate and distinct Fourth Amendment violation. As the Court
explained, “Excessive force claims . . . are evaluated for objective
reasonableness based upon the information the officers had when
218
the conduct occurred.” Implicit in this explanation is that the
“conduct” at issue was the use of force rather than any preceding
actions. And if the officer acted reasonably when using force,
“there is no valid excessive force claim.” 219 In rejecting the provocation rule, the Court dispelled the notion that a Fourth Amendment violation (excessive force) can be predicated on a different
Fourth Amendment violation (warrantless search). The Court said,
220
“[t]hey should be analyzed separately.”
The Mendez plaintiffs, however, did not merely seek to defend
the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule. Rather, they sought affirmance based on the “totality of the circumstances” test articulated
in Graham. They argued that the Graham progeny inappropriately
221
narrowed the inquiry to the “final frame.” In their estimation,
the test should be more holistic: “On respondent’s view, that
means taking into account unreasonable police conduct prior to
222
the use of force that foreseeably created the need to use it.” Ra-

217. Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoted with approval in
Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1546).
218. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001) (quoted with approval in Mendez, 137 S.
Ct. at 1546–47).
219. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1547.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 1547 n.2; Brief of Respondents at 34, County of Los Angeles v. Mendez,
137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017), 2017 WL 696103; see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 777
(2014) (assessing threat “at the moment when the shots were fired”); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206
(denoting the “temporal perspective of the inquiry”); id. at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(“The proper perspective in judging an excessive force claim, Graham explained, is that of ‘a
reasonable officer on the scene’ and ‘at the moment’ force was employed.”) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)); Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable Is the Reasonable Man?: Police and Excessive Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481,
491–92 (1994).
222. See Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1547 n.2 (internal citation omitted).
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ther than viewing the warrantless search as a separate Fourth
Amendment violation, the plaintiffs wanted the Court to view the
search as preceding conduct that foreseeably led to the use of
force. The Court noted that it did not grant certiorari on the question and, therefore, declined to address the merits of the argu223
ment. Whether such preceding conduct is part of the analysis
remains an open question.
To test the “totality of the circumstances” test espoused by the
Mendez plaintiffs, I want to slightly change the fact pattern. Imagine
that the officers still approached the home from both the front
door and backyard. The two officers who committed the warrantless search by going through the backyard still came upon the man
with the BB gun that resembled a small caliber rifle. However, in
response to seeing the man holding the gun, imagine a newlyarrived officer, who originally entered the front door, fired in
(perceived) defense of his fellow officers. Under the “final frame”
Fourth Amendment analysis, the shooting would likely not be considered excessive force. Indeed, it is difficult to assign liability to
the shooter where he did not act wrongfully. The officer did not
conduct an unconstitutional search, as he entered through the
front door. And, assuming (as the court found in Mendez) that the
shooting was based on a reasonable belief of an imminent deadly
threat, his conduct was privileged. Likewise, it is difficult to characterize the conduct of the officer who came through the backyard as
excessive force when he did not fire his weapon. This is not to suggest that the officer was without fault. Certainly the officer’s con224
duct was intentional insofar as it was a warrantless search. But the
intentionality of the conduct (i.e., entering through the backyard)
was not performed for the purpose of instigating the shooting.
Under modern tort law, therefore, the search would not be considered an intentional tort for purposes of assessing the physical
injury (as opposed to a trespass). Nonetheless, if the court found
that the substandard care with which the officer entered the property proximately caused the physical injury, then the conduct is
more appropriately characterized as antecedent negligence.
The analytical distinction between antecedent negligence and a
continuum of intentional conduct in the law enforcement context
225
is not easily discernable. Indeed, in Young, the court found that
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Fyfe, supra note 11, at 475–77 (suggesting that tactical knowledge and concealment would minimize the risk to officers and suspects and prevent tragic mistakes).
225. See Campbell v. White, 916 F.2d 421, 422–23 (7th Cir. 1990) (“To presume the existence of a seizure under the circumstances presented in this case ignores the distinction
that has been made between an accidental or tortious act which happens to be committed
by a government official and an intentional detention that rises to the level of a constitu-
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the officer was negligent when he dangerously placed his patrol car
in a “cut-off” maneuver. Could such a technique be considered an
226
intentional roadblock, more analogous to Brower? Does an officer
who steps in front of a moving vehicle act intentionally or negligently? Do officers who drive upon a scene without taking proper
227
precautions intentionally or negligently escalate a situation? In a
case where an officer released a dog (intentionally or otherwise)
on the surrendering suspect, the court noted that the officers
could not be liable for “rush[ing] into . . . the killing zone without
228
a plan.” Yet, another court reasoned that while releasing a dog
on a suspect was intentional, the decision may have been based on
negligent reasoning, thereby creating a cause of action for negli229
gent use of excessive force. The fact that some courts still grapple
with the fallacious concept of “negligent use of excessive force”
underscores that, until the characterization conundrum for various
types of government conduct is resolved, sustainable reform of the
Bivens remedy will remain elusive.
The question then becomes, how do we devise a remedial regime that compensates without getting bogged down in the characterization conundrum? Tort liability should not rise and fall on
230
such analytical nitpicking. Unfortunately, under the current public tort law, wherein constitutional torts are siloed into Bivens ac-

tional violation.”); Apodaca v. Rio Arriba Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 905 F.2d 1445, 1447 (10th Cir.
1990) (“Collisions between police vehicles and others caused by police negligence clearly
falls on the ‘tort’ side of the line.”).
226. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
227. See, e.g., Dietzmann v. City of Homer, Case No. 3:09-cv-0019-RJB, 2010 WL 4684043
(D. Alaska Nov. 17, 2010) (negligence claims against United States for U.S. Marshal agents
using vehicles to pin defendant to effectuate an arrest), aff’d sub nom. Dietzmann v. Hutt,
479 Fed. App’x 108 (9th Cir. 2012).
228. Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2015) (Higginbotham, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation omitted).
229. Ryan v. Napier, 406 P.3d 330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017), overruled by 425 P.3d 230 (Ariz.
2018); see also Milcent v. City of Boston, No. 14-cv-13347-GAO, 2016 WL 845303, at *4 (D.
Mass. Feb. 29, 2016) (“A public employer may be held vicariously liable for the negligent use
of excessive force of one of its employees.”); Reed v. District of Columbia, 474 F. Supp. 2d
163, 174 (D.D.C. 2007) (allowing case to go forward because “a distinct act of negligence, a
misperception of fact, may have played a part in the decision to fire”) (quoting District of
Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701, 709–10 (D.C. 2003)); John F. Preis, Alternative State Remedies In Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723, 750–55 (2008) (outlining numerous scenarios wherein a police officer acted reasonably but ultimately unconstitutionally that may not
establish a prima facie case under state tort law because “this would entail holding that reasonable behavior can simultaneously be ‘offensive,’ clearly a discordant result”). See generally
Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 207 P.3d 506, 517 (Cal. 2007) (explaining the difference between “the officers’ alleged negligence in using deadly force” and “whether the officer were
negligent in creating a situation in which it was reasonable for them to use deadly force.”)
(emphasis in original).
230. See generally Sugarman, supra note 199 (outlining the analytical difficulty between
negligence and intentional actions to call for a single cause of action based on wrongfulness).
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tions and common-law torts are siloed into FTCA actions, the delineation is dispositive. From a compensatory standpoint, wrongful
conduct that proximately causes injury should provide an adequate
remedy. Given jurists’ and scholars’ considerable struggles in distinguishing between intent and negligence, an ideal remedial regime would prevent such analytical parsing from becoming outcome determinative and instead focus on maximizing compensacompensation for wrongful conduct, incentivizing better decision
making at the agency level, and focusing individual punishment
towards ill-motived officers.
C. Discretionary Function Exception vs. Law Enforcement Proviso
Before endorsing the concept of tort justice, one must consider
whether it should be the role of courts to scrutinize law enforcement practices. The fact that common-law tort jurisprudence has
the capacity to scrutinize a broad array of law enforcement conduct beyond the immediate exertion of force does not answer the
question of whether such judicial review is warranted, much less
constitutionally permissible. Conservative tort theorists discredit
such adjudications as judicial usurpation of the executive branch
231
and its exclusive authority over law enforcement agencies. Judicial assessments of the manner in which administrative agencies
carry out their mandates arguably place the judicial branch in the
role of de facto policy makers. This jurisprudential dilemma undergirds the core tension between the discretionary function exception and the proviso to intentional tort exceptions to the FTCA.
Law enforcement agencies are constantly faced with difficult
judgments about the best way to fulfill their missions. Ensuring the
safety and welfare of officers and the general public while performing law enforcement functions often depend on the specific facts
on the ground and require a sober consideration of a multitude of
factors. Given that agencies require discretion to perform core
functions, actions arising from such decision making are often
immune to judicial scrutiny. The discretionary function exception
reflects this viewpoint.
The discretionary function exception provides that the United
States may not be held liable based on “the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
231. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 328 (“Not surprisingly, to combat the alleged evils of
illicit regulation, reformers have sought and obtained measures whose main aim is to reduce
the occasions for tort regulations.”).
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Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”232
The United States Supreme Court has devised a two-prong test for
determining whether an action is barred by the discretionary function exception. The first prong asks whether the conduct involves
“an element of judgment or choice” by the federal agency or em233
ployee. That inquiry focuses on whether any “controlling statute
or regulation mandates that a government agent perform his or
234
her function in a specific manner.” When a federal statute, regulation, or policy “specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow . . . the employee has no rightful option but to
235
adhere to the directive.” Absent any discretion in the employee’s
ability to perform the conduct, the exception does not apply.
Discretion alone does not invoke the exception. The second
prong examines whether the action taken was the kind of conduct
that the exception was intended to shield. The “focus of the inquiry is not on the agent’s subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the
actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analy236
sis.” In determining whether an action is susceptible to policy
analysis, courts assess whether they are “decisions grounded in so237
cial, economic, and political policy.” Even if such discretion is
abused or leads to unfortunate results, the fact that such decisions
are susceptible to judgment render them beyond review by the ju238
dicial branch.
To date, the Eleventh Circuit is the only appellate court to hold
that claims made under the law enforcement proviso cannot be
239
categorically barred by the discretionary function exception. In
Nguyen v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit, citing a statutory canon of construction, reasoned that the more specific law enforcement proviso, which enumerates six specific intentional torts,

232. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2018).
233. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
234. Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1125 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoted with approval
in Hughes v. United States, 110 F.3d 765, 768 (11th Cir. 1997)).
235. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536 (quoted with approval in United States v. Gaubert, 499
U.S. 315, 322 (1991)); see also Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1250 n.2 (11th Cir.
2009).
236. Gaubert, 486 U.S. at 325.
237. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
238. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325; Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716, 721 (4th Cir.
1993) (Courts are to look at “the nature of the challenged decision in an objective, or general sense, and ask whether that decision is one we would expect inherently to be grounded
in considerations of policy.”) (internal citation omitted); Hughes v. United States, 110 F.3d
765, 768 (11th Cir. 1997) (granting immunity even if discretionary decision by the Postal
Service failed to provide adequate security at the post office).
239. See Nguyen, 556 F.3d 1244.
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trumps the more amorphous discretionary function exception.
The appellate panel determined that Congress was aware of the
discretionary function exception when it enacted the proviso, so
Congress intended the newer provision to supersede the older
prohibitor. Given that the proviso was written broadly to include all
claims “arising out of” the enumerated torts, the Nguyen reasoning
could extend to claims of antecedent negligence that lead to the
240
use of force.
Other circuit courts generally agree that “if the law enforcement
proviso is to be more than an illusory . . . remedy, the discretionary
function exception cannot be an absolute bar which one must
241
clear to proceed under § 2680(h).” Still, courts generally have

240. In United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985), the Court was confronted with the
issue of whether that provision bars claims characterized as negligence even though the ultimate injury stemmed from an assault and battery. The Court avoided the issue by deciding
the case based on the Feres doctrine. Still, a plurality noted that “Section 2680(h) does not
merely bar claims for assault and battery; in sweeping language it excludes any claims arising
out of assault and battery. We read this provision to cover claims like respondent’s that
sound in negligence but stem from a battery committed by a Government employee.” Id. at
55 (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion suggested that cases based on antecedent negligence, such as negligent supervision, are barred if the injuries arose from an intentional
tort. In Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1987), the Court again sidestepped the issue
by deciding the case based on the employment status of the federal actor. See id. at 402. The
opinion compelled a strong dissent, which invoked Shearer to conclude that the exception
“encompasses all injuries associated in any way with an assault and battery.” Id. at 409
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence in which he invoked traditional tort doctrines to distinguish between claims characterized as intentional torts and
negligence. Id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Yet, without clear guidance from the Supreme Court, most circuits have followed the Shearer plurality. Cf. Franklin v. United States,
992 F.2d 1492, 1499 (10th Cir. 1993); Westcott v. Omaha City, 901 F.2d 1486, 1490 (8th Cir.
1990); Garcia v. United States, 776 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1985) (preventing negligent supervision claim in action arising from sexual assault); Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d
393, 394–96 (4th Cir. 1986) (adopting the broad interpretation advanced in Shearer plurality). But see Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1503–03 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to
follow the Shearer plurality as dicta). Some scholars have pointed to this controversy, as well
as the inherent injustice in denying compensation for assaults and batteries committed by
non-law enforcement agents, as the basis for eliminating the intentional tort exception altogether. See Jack W. Massey, A Proposal To Narrow The Assault and Battery Exception To The Federal Tort Claims Act, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1621, 1644 (2004) (“Insofar as the majority application of
the FTCA leaves a class of severely injured plaintiffs with poor chances of being made whole,
and it treats some plaintiffs differently than others based on the vicissitudes of an assailant’s
employment, it is inequitable.”). Of course, in previous examples, I argued that certain conduct may not constitute a battery if preceded by negligence. See discussion supra Section
III.B. In such instances, it would be difficult to argue that the case “arose from” an intentional tort. Moreover, as the intentional tort exception does not prevent adjudications based
on antecedent negligence for claims arising from intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers, this Article does not need to wade into the debate other than to note the
general importance of properly characterizing public tort actions based on a broad array of
government conduct. The Article highlights the controversy as further evidence of confusion surrounding public tort law in this important area and advocates that any amendment
should address these issues comprehensively.
241. Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987); Caban v. United States
(Caban I), 671 F.2d 1230, 1234 (2d Cir. 1982) (understanding the provisions should not “be
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found “no serious incongruity between the immunity afforded under section 2680(a) and the waiver of immunity under the proviso
242
to section 2680(h).” Courts instead have attempted to reconcile
the provisions by assessing whether the conduct at issue involves
the type of decisions traditionally immunized by the discretionary
function exception or is more properly characterized as conduct
243
that Congress intended to deter through the proviso.
In reconciling the law enforcement proviso and the discretionary function exception, courts have looked to the claim’s substance
244
to properly characterize the alleged tortious conduct. General
claims that an agency should have initiated an investigation or acted upon warning signs are typically immune from judicial review:
“Investigations by federal law enforcement officials . . . clearly require investigative officers to consider relevant political and social
circumstances in making decisions about the nature and scope of a
245
criminal investigation.” The discretion has likewise been applied
to prosecutorial determinations. As the Fifth Circuit has averred,
[t]he federal government’s decision concerning enforcement of its criminal statutes comprise a part of its pursuit of
national policy. If the government could be held liable for
prosecuting or failing to prosecute such a case, its choices
in this area could quite conceivably be affected by such a
suit. Thus, a policy decision of the federal government
might be influenced by a plaintiff with no governmental re246
sponsibility.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has warned that the discretionary-function exception does not distinguish between policy
247
and operational decisions. The level at which a decision is
made—whether it concerns the planning or executing of an operation—is not the dispositive inquiry. Nor does the “routine or frequent nature of a decision” impact the analysis. The discretionary

read to eviscerate each other”). See generally Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.
1983) (“Our duty . . . is to reconcile them and give meaning to both if we are able.”).
242. Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
243. See, e.g., Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 224–26 (4th Cir. 2001); Gasho v.
United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806, 809
(9th Cir. 1987); Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 871-72 (3d Cir. 1986).
244. Milligan v. United States, 670 F.3d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In determining
whether the plaintiff’s claim falls within the law enforcement exception to the intentional
tort exception, we must look to the substance of the claim and not limit our review to how
the plaintiff pleaded the cause of action.”).
245. Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996).
246. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967).
247. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 326 (1991).
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function exception was not intended to be relegated to high-level
decisions regarding whether to initiate an investigation or to prosecute. Rather, each decision must be examined to determine
whether it is grounded in policy factors immune from judicial scrutiny.
That fact-specific approach is easier said than done. The difficultly in applying the discretionary function exception test in law
enforcement cases is most pronounced in instances that blur the
line between policy and operational decisions, such as the protec248
tion of informants in the witness protection program; the use of
249
interrogations; the decision when to effectuate an otherwise law250
ful arrest; and the decision to terminate an arrest or release
251
someone in custody. With respect to law enforcement techniques
and practices, such as the decision to make an arrest or the
amount of force to exert, courts have found that such conduct typically does not involve the type of decision making that the discre252
tionary function exception was intended to protect. Such decisions do not involve the type of political, social, or economic
calculations that caution judicial restraint. As one court has suggested in cases involving “persons (such as police officers) whose
jobs do not typically include discretionary functions, it will be rare
that a suit permissible under the proviso to section 2680(h) is
253
barred by section 2680(a).”

248. See, e.g., Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (failure to protect informant’s identity); Fuller-Avent v. U.S. Probation Office, 226 Fed. App’x 1, 2–3 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (disclosure of criminal history to employer); Lawrence v. United States, 340 F.3d
952, 958 (9th Cir. 2003) (supervision of person placed in witness protection program);
Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207, 1213 (4th Cir. 1989) (failure to provide witness
protection); Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 870–871 (3d Cir. 1986) (use of informant
when conducting investigation); Jet Industries Inc. v. United States, 777 F.2d 303, 305–06
(5th Cir. 1985) (selection and supervision of participants in the federal witness protection
program); Ostera v. United States, 769 F.2d 716, 718 (11th Cir. 1985) (selection and supervision of informant); Taitt v. United States, 770 F.2d 890, 893 (10th Cir. 1985) (admission
into witness protection program); Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789, 794 (8th
Cir.1982) (admission into witness protection program).
249. O’Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2001).
250. Shuler, 531 F.3d at 934 (“Decisions regarding the timing of arrests are the kind of
discretionary government decisions, rife with considerations of public policy, that Congress
did not want the judiciary second-guessing.”) (internal citation omitted).
251. Deuser v. Vecera, 139 F.3d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir.1998) (decision to terminate arrest
of intoxicated person); Prelvitz v. Milsop, 831 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 1987) (decision to allow intoxicated person to drive in lieu of detaining all passengers); Flammia v. United
States, 739 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 1984) (release of immigration detainee).
252. See Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1987) (use of force by border
patrol agent in making arrest did not involve “the sort of generalized social, economic and
political policy choices that Congress intended to exempt from tort liability”) (internal citation omitted).
253. Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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Still, other courts have refused to second-guess the conduct of
254
law enforcement operations. This deference occurs even in instances where the court simultaneously condemns the conduct of
255
others who are part of or assisting with the operation. Employing
such logic, some courts have cited the discretionary function exception to dismiss cases with fact patterns eerily similar to the raids
in Collinsville, Illinois—the no-knock raids that led to the law enforcement proviso. In Mesa v. United States, the court applied the
discretionary function exception to bar claims based on DEA
agents negligently or recklessly executing a valid arrest warrant
256
upon the wrong person. The court reasoned that “the execution
of an arrest warrant is a fundamental discretionary investigative determination replete with policy choices . . . It is not for this Court
257
to question the plain mandate of Congress.” In Casillas v. United
258
States, FBI agents wore black hoods and entered the plaintiffs’
home brandishing assault weapons. The agents ordered the family,
including their three-year-old daughter, to lie face down at gun
point. After the officers handcuffed the father and questioned the
parents, it was determined that the officers were not at their intended location despite having procured a search warrant for the
address. The government agents blamed the mistake on an “error
259
in proofreading the affidavit.” The court found that there was no
private person analogue for seeking a search warrant, so the negli260
gence claim could not proceed. Moreover, the agents’ actions in
obtaining the search warrant fell within the discretionary function
exception.

254. See, e.g., Mid-South Holding Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1201, 1205-1207 (11th
Cir. 2000) (regarding the negligent performance of a search of vessel causing it to sink);
Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 784 (1st Cir. 1992) (regarding decisions about
whether or not to make stops and searches at customs checkpoint); B&F Trawlers, Inc. v.
United States, 841 F.2d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 1988) (regarding apprehension and transportation of drug-running vessels).
255. See, e.g., Suter v. United States, 441 F.3d 306, 311–12 (4th Cir. 2006) (regarding FBI
agent’s participation in and approval of criminal activity during undercover investigation);
Ga. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 823 F.2d 260, 263 (8th Cir.1987) (holding that a claim
for financial losses arising from the FBI’s undercover investigation of an automobile theft
ring was barred because “[t]he FBI’s decision to maintain secrecy . . . involved the balancing
of policy considerations protected by the discretionary function exception”); Frigard v.
United States, 862 F.2d 201, 203 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (holding that a suit alleging
financial fraud by an investment company used by the CIA as a cover for its operations was
barred by the discretionary function exception because “the alleged decisions by the CIA to
use [the company] and to keep its use of the company secret are administrative decisions
grounded in social and economic policy.”).
256. 837 F. Supp. 1210, 1216 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
257. Id.
258. No. CV 07–395–TUC–DCB (HCE), 2009 WL 735193 (D. Ariz. Feb 11, 2009).
259. Id. at *5.
260. Id. (citing Washington v. DEA, 183 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 1999); Wright v. United
States, 963 F. Supp. 7, 16–17 (D.D.C. 1997)).
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Thus, taken to its logical endpoint, the discretionary function
exception can lead to results that would effectively eviscerate the
law enforcement proviso. If agencies were permitted to characterize the manner in which they effectuate arrest warrants as discretionary acts, the very type of raid that served as the impetus for the
proviso would be shielded from judicial review. Yet, some courts
view such decisions not as intentional torts, but as antecedent decisions that are immune to judicial second-guessing. The law enforcement proviso was enacted to permit compensation for tortious conduct committed by investigative or law enforcement
261
officials, and its purpose should not be obfuscated by an agency’s
assertion that the nature of their action was discretionary and
therefore immune from legal scrutiny.
To understand the intent of the law enforcement proviso and,
by extension, its relationship to the discretionary function exception, we need to examine the events that led to its enactment.
When federal and state narcotics officers mistakenly raided the
homes of two families in Collinsville, Illinois, they did so at the behest of the St. Louis Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement
(DALE)—the federal agency that preceded the Drug Enforcement
262
Administration. As the investigation of the Collinsville raids unfolded, it became evident that the wrongful conduct was twofold:
the failure to obtain valid warrants and the manner in which the
officers performed the no-knock searches. This is not uncommon,
263
as there are often multiple proximate causes for the same injury.
Those two activities—procuring a warrant (or the failure to do so)
and executing a search warrant—are often characterized as sepa264
rate and distinct torts. By bifurcating the conduct as actions by
two distinct groups, the analysis demonstrates how the intent of the
law enforcement proviso is not fully realized simply by focusing on
the last tortious conduct.
A law enforcement officer is privileged to arrest an individual
265
under a warrant that is valid or fair on its face. But what if the
warrant was, in fact, not valid? What happens when the officers
who exerted force were simply performing their duties under the
reasonable, but ultimately mistaken, belief that a proper warrant

261. For purposes of the law enforcement proviso, “‘investigative or law enforcement
officer’ means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches,
to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(2018).
262. Boger et al., supra note 52, at 501.
263. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 703–04 (2004).
264. Id.; see also Casillas, 2009 WL 735193.
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 122 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).

704

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 52:3

had been procured? 266 Under constitutional tort law, individual officers have not committed a Fourth Amendment violation (and escape potentially paying damages out of pocket) when reasonably
performing their duties. Officers are entitled to rely on the perceived validity of warrants and those responsible for procuring
267
them. If the officers who effectuated a search warrant were sued
in their personal capacities, they would be entitled to assert the defense that they acted objectively reasonably under the circum268
stances. Their conduct would not be considered a constitutional
violation. In such instances, the physical contact with the plaintiffs
was intentional, but privileged. Rather, the touching was the manifestation of an earlier “wrongful” conduct—the procurement (or
lack thereof) of the warrant.
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts notes,
“[w]hen the privilege is conditional, a person is sometimes
protected by his reasonable belief in the existence of facts
that would give rise to a privilege, even though the facts do
not exist . . . [such as] a policeman is not liable for mistakenly arresting one whom he believes to have committed a
269
felony.”
Officers cannot be said to have engaged in wrongful conduct when
performing their duties based on their reasonable, but mistaken,
270
belief that an arrest was justified. If the arresting officer acted
based on a warrant that was valid on its face, some jurisdictions do
not characterize the tortious conduct as a false arrest or false im271
prisonment. Of course, the officers carrying out a warrant may

266. Id. §§ 124, 125.
267. See Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006) (“When making a probable
cause determination, police officers are ‘entitled to rely on the allegations of fellow police
officers.’”) (quoting Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000)); Arnsberg v.
United States, 757 F.2d 971, 981 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that it would be “unreasonable to
rule that the arresting officers . . . must take issue with the considered judgment of an assistant United States Attorney and the federal magistrate”).
268. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139–43 (1979) (no constitutional injury when
the plaintiff was mistakenly arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant).
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
270. See, e.g., Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Assuming the
information Agent Clifford relied upon was wrong, probable cause exists even where it is
based upon mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer was reasonable in relying
on that information . . . . Thus, the determination of probable cause does not turn on
whether Agent #1’s observations were accurate, but on whether Agent Clifford was reasonable in relying on those observations.”) (internal citation omitted).
271. See, e.g., Wilcox v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1981); Boose v. City of
Rochester, 71 A.D.2d 59, 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (“An arrest made pursuant to a warrant
valid on its face and issued by a court having jurisdiction of the crime and person is privileged.”). If officers fail to use due diligence and arrest the wrong person based on a valid
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commit an intentional tort in the event they exceed the scope of
reasonable conduct—using a SWAT-style technique to arrest a
misdemeanant or engaging in a “personal vendetta of wanton de272
struction.” But absent such overzealousness, the tortious conduct
was not merely the intentionality with which the officers effectuated the raids, but their wrongfulness in failing to procure a proper
273
warrant. Such claims may be more appropriately characterized as
274
a malicious prosecution or abuse of process.
Malicious prosecution and abuse of process are two of the enumerated torts in the FTCA law enforcement proviso. As the Senate
Report noted, “[t]he effect of this provision is to deprive the Federal Government of the defense of sovereign immunity in cases in
which Federal law enforcement agents [act] within the scope of
275
their employment, or under color of Federal law . . . .” The Supreme Court has concluded that the proviso covers more than tortious conduct committed in the course of executing a search, seiz276
ing evidence, or making an arrest. The Court recognized that
“Congress intended immunity determinations to depend on a federal officer’s legal authority, not on a particular exercise of that au277
thority.” In order to fulfill the intent of the law enforcement proviso, courts should look beyond the manifestation of the injury,
often characterized as an assault and battery, and adjudge antecedent wrongful conduct that proximately caused the harmful
touching. Thus, Congress intended to permit judicial review of antecedent conduct that led to wrongful searches and seizures to al-

arrest warrant, a false arrest claims may still be brought. Dennis v. New York, 96 A.D.2d 1143
(illustrating “misnomer” cases of choosing between two possible arrestees).
272. Boger et al., supra note 52, at 502 (internal quotation omitted); see also Gasho v.
United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to dismiss an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim due to alleged conduct of the officer at the time of the arrest); Wright v. United States, 963 F. Supp. 7, 17 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[T]here is no question that
the FTCA creates a right of action for torts committed during the unreasonable execution
of a search warrant.”).
273. See Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1432; see also Cominotto v. United States, 802 F.2d 1127, 1130
(9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that the tortious conduct was “not necessarily at the site of the
injury or the place where the negligence has its ‘operative effect’”) (quoting Sami v. United
States, 617 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
274. Johnson v. Kings Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 763 N.Y.S.2d 635, 641–42 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003) (“Generally, where there is an alleged unlawful arrest made pursuant to a valid
warrant, the appropriate form of action is one for malicious prosecution, not false imprisonment . . . .”) (internal citation omitted). Malicious prosecution requires “the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff.” Id. at
641. Justification based on another state’s arrest warrant “serves as a complete defense to a
claim of false arrest and imprisonment and eliminates an essential element of a claim for
malicious prosecution . . . .” Heath v. State, 645 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (N.Y. App. Div.1996)
(quoted with approval in Johnson, 763 N.Y.S.2d at 639).
275. S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2791 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791.
276. See Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50, 56–57 (2013).
277. Id. at 56.
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low for a claim of malicious prosecution under the law enforce278
ment proviso.

278. See Milligan v. United States, 670 F.3d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 2012). Yet, courts are torn
as to whether the application of a search warrant—the very antecedent conduct at issue in
Collinsville—constitutes a discretionary act. See Wright v. United States, 963 F. Supp. 7, 17
(D.D.C. 1997); Patel v. United States, 806 F. Supp. 873, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1992); McElroy v.
United States, 861 F. Supp. 585, 593 (W.D. Tex. 1994). Some courts have properly characterized claims stemming from effecting an arrest warrant, not as an assault and battery, but
as a result of tortious activity in obtaining the warrant. In Milligan v. United States, the Sixth
Circuit held that an administrative error leading to the arrest of an innocent person
amounted to a claim of negligence. 670 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2012). The physical interaction
was not an assault and battery; rather, it was simply the manifestation of the original wrongful conduct. Yet, after acknowledging that the conduct at issue concerned the same type of
activity as the Collinsville raids—the procurement of a warrant—the appellate panel held
that such conduct was immune from suit under the discretionary function exception. Id. at
695; see also Kerns v. United States, No. CV-04-01937-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL 552227 (D. Ariz.
Feb. 21, 2007), rev’d, No. 07-15769, 2009 WL 226207 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2009); Doherty v.
United States, 905 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D. Mass. 1995); McElroy, 861 F. Supp. At 593. But whether antecedent negligence can be the basis of the intentional tort of abuse of process is a different question than whether such conduct is beyond judicial scrutiny. Johnson v. Kings Cty.
Dist. Attorney’s Office, 763 N.Y.S.2d 635, 643 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (“It is not necessary to
address the issue of whether the defendants’ actions were justified or whether process was
perverted to obtain a collateral objective; it is enough to note that the plaintiff’s abuse of
process claim is premised on negligence. It is self-evident that a claim of negligence cannot
support this intentional tort.”). Indeed, other courts have held that antecedent negligence
concerning the procurement of a warrant was not the type of conduct that the discretionary
function exception guards against. Compare Milligan, 670 F.3d 686 (characterizing the administrative error as negligent and applying the discretionary function exception), with
Carter v. United States, 725 F. Supp. 2d 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (characterizing clerical error
leading to mistaken arrest as negligence and holding that discretionary function exception
did not bar recovery), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 494 F. App’x 148 (2d Cir.
2012). Suggesting that procuring a warrant is immune from judicial scrutiny under the discretionary function exception ignores the fact that part of the “wrongful” conduct that led
to the intentional tort exception was procuring a warrant. The conduct at issue was not
merely the manner in which the DALE agents effectuated the search, but also the decision
to do so without a valid warrant.
Of course, the decision not to procure warrants in Collinsville, Illinois, was not mere
negligence; it was sufficiently intentional to result in Bivens actions. Congress enacted the
law enforcement proviso to provide a parallel action against the United States. The problem
arises for claims not amounting to a constitutional violation but nonetheless aimed at conduct beyond the mere manifestation of the injury (i.e., assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or abuse of power). As previously discussed, the analytical distinction between intentional torts and battery is often convoluted in the law
enforcement context. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 42, § 9.05[2][h] (“[T]he test is
whether the plaintiff has stated a valid negligence claim that is wholly independent of the
excluded tort.”). It would be odd to suggest that courts have the authority to examine the
continuum of intentional conduct that leads to the use of force, therefore potentially constituting a Fourth Amendment violation, but lack subject matter jurisdiction when the officer
approaches negligently. See Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1396 (3d Cir. 1972)
(“This is consistent with the strong public policy expressed in the statute to waive immunity
for injuries caused by negligence of employees and to except claims arising out of assault or
battery.”). Similarly, it would be inequitable to suggest that courts may find that the intentional decision to procure a warrant was unconstitutional but the same conduct, when performed negligently, is immune from judicial scrutiny. Law enforcement activity that leads to
arrests and searches, such as procuring a warrant, whether performed negligently or intentionally, should not be considered the type of conduct immune from judicial review under
the discretionary function exception.
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The discretionary function exception does not stand as an impediment to permitting constitutional tort claims under the
279
FTCA. Most courts have concluded that the discretionary function exception does not encompass actions by government agents
that are “unconstitutional, proscribed by statute, or exceed the
280
scope of an official’s authority.” Simply put, the government does
281
not have the discretion to violate the Constitution. If law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest, then their actions
would not give rise to liability, thus obviating the need to assert the
discretionary function exception. On the other hand, if the officers
lacked probable cause, the decision to arrest is not protected by
the discretionary function exception because the conduct is unconstitutional. Of course, to recover under the FTCA, the plaintiff
282
must still demonstrate that the conduct violated a state law. Cases
often arise in which parallel Bivens and FTCA actions are brought
and allege constitutional infractions by the individual officer and
common-law torts by the government. In such cases, the United
States typically will not assert the discretionary function exception
unless it is clear that there was no constitutional violation. The
FTCA claims and Bivens claims often address a common nucleus of
operative facts, and should constitutional torts become cognizable
under the statute, the discretionary function exception would not
undermine the remedial restructuring.

279. Indeed, for courts that have found that the discretionary function exception may
apply even in instances where the plaintiff alleged constitutional violations, the reasoning
stems from the need to mirror qualified immunity afforded to the tortfeasor. See Castro v.
United States, 560 F.3d 381, 394 (5th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting), vacated, 608 F.3d 266
(5th Cir. 2010) (en banc). As qualified immunity would no longer be necessary under the
FTCA constitutional tort law model, such an argument would become moot.
280. Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 254 (1st Cir. 2003).
281. See Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 758 (9th Cir. 2004) (“As [f]ederal officials do not
possess discretion to violate constitutional rights . . . the discretionary function exception
does not apply here.”) (internal citations omitted); Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945, 948
(8th Cir. 2003) (“We must also conclude that the FBI’s alleged surveillance activities fall outside the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception because [plaintiff] alleged they were conducted in violation of his First and Fourth Amendment rights.”); Medina v. United States,
259 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2001) (In “determin[ing] the bounds of the discretionary function exception found in § 2680(a) . . . we begin with the principle that federal officials do
not possess discretion to violate constitutional rights or federal statutes.”) (internal citations
omitted); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th Cir.1987) (“[W]e have not hesitated to conclude that [an] action does not fall within the discretionary function [exception] of § 2680(a) when governmental agents exceed the scope of their authority as designated by statute or the Constitution.”); Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527
F.2d 1252, 1261 (2d Cir. 1975) (“It is, of course, a tautology that a federal official cannot
have discretion to behave unconstitutionally or outside the scope of his delegated authority.”). But see Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626, 627–28 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that
conduct by commanding officer of military base, although “constitutionally repugnant,” fell
within the discretionary function exception).
282. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994).
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Nor should the discretionary function exception stand as an impediment to claims based on the antecedent negligence of law enforcement officers when such negligence leads to intentional
283
torts. The exception would still apply to the decision of whether
and how to investigate, including prioritizing investigations and allocating resources. But the law enforcement proviso recognizes
that society bestows unique authority onto public officials capable
of performing searches of homes and arrests of citizens: “The intent of the [law enforcement proviso] is to provide recovery for injuries caused by the government even in instances in which the
government believed such actions necessary to meet some mis284
guided notions of internal security.” Courts have the institutional
knowledge of law enforcement practices and are well-equipped to
adjudge unconstitutional, as well as negligent, police conduct and
misguided notions of internal security. Such decisions are not regarded as judicial overreach in other contexts. Indeed, such adjudications serve as the bedrock of criminal procedure jurisprudence.
There are numerous safeguards to prevent judicial overreaching
into powers exclusively reserved to the other government branches. The discretionary function exception was conceived from the
separation-of-power doctrine that requires courts to not interfere
with authorities expressly bestowed upon the other branches of
285
government. As courts have recognized, such judicial inaction
would be warranted in certain scenarios even if the discretionary
286
function exception did not explicitly mandate restraint. Nothing
would prevent courts from using the traditional political question
doctrine to determine whether the issue is beyond judicial scrutiny.
Similarly, under the FTCA, the United States is “entitled to assert
any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the United
287
States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” These other
defenses include absolute immunity from prosecutorial and judi288
cial decision. These immunities would continue even in the absence of the discretionary function exception.
283. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
284. Boger et al., supra note 52, at 532.
285. See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
467 U.S. 797, 809–10 (1984).
286. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760–61 (1984) (relying on separation of
powers argument to limit judicial review); McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 336–38
(4th Cir. 2004).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2018); see Wise v. United States, No. 6:09-cv-0901-MBS, 2009 WL
5171215, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 18, 2009), aff’d, 393 F. App’x 112 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
288. See Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because the FTCA
does not authorize suits for intentional torts based upon the actions of Government prose-
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Other litigative hurdles prevent FTCA adjudications from becoming de facto judicial legislation. Under the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, a plaintiff still needs to provide sufficient factual
specificity to give rise to a plausible inference of tortious behav289
ior. It is not enough to simply allege conclusory statements, such
as to claim that an investigation was handled negligently. To withstand a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must assert claims with sufficient factual specificity to allege plausible misconduct.
At the same time, in cases alleging tortious law enforcement
conduct, factors that previously led to the assertion of the discretionary function exception are still available to contest the merits
of the claim. Some jurisdictions do not recognize generalized no290
tions of negligent or malicious investigation. In applying the discretionary function exception, the Seventh Circuit reasoned,
“[d]oing nothing may be the most constructive use of . . . resources.” Similarly, under general tort law, a defendant’s duty is
more limited when the claim is based on an omission rather than
291
an affirmative action. Plaintiffs cannot simply cite the absence of
conduct and their injuries to succeed in a negligence claim. The
decision to “do nothing” would still be a valid defense on the merits. Even where the discretionary function exception would not
shield law enforcement officers, a plaintiff would still need to
292
demonstrate that the actor owed a duty of care and any breach of
that duty proximately caused the injury.
Expert testimony is often necessary to establish the appropriate
standard of care and to determine whether a breach occurred in
tort cases. Law enforcement experts factor the myriad of concerns
facing officers as they confront a particular situation. Such experts
have been trained to ignore hindsight bias and analyze the situation from the officer’s perspective, including the various contin-

cutors, plaintiff cannot support his malicious prosecution claim with facts that arose after his
indictment.”).
289. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
290. Johnson v. Kings Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 763 N.Y.S.2d 635, 640 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003) (“It is well settled that New York courts do not recognize claims for negligent or malicious investigation.”).
291. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 268 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Generally speaking, a defendant’s duty is more limited when negligence consists of an omission rather than
an act of commission.”) (citing Carrier v. Riddell, Inc., 721 F.2d 867, 868–89 (1st Cir.
1983)).
292. See, e.g., Dugard v. United States, 835 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding that
private rehabilitation entities do not owe a duty of care to the public at large); Ochran v.
United States, 273 F.3d 1315, 1317–15 (11th Cir. 2001) (similarly concluding the prosecutor
did not owe the informant a duty of care because no special relationship was formed).
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gencies that factor into decision making. 293 Even when factoring in
the concerns for officer safety and split-second judgments, experts
can provide testimony to a reasonable degree of certainty about
whether there was a breach of the standard of care.
Such expert testimony also helps alleviate another concern
voiced by Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Garner—the use of social
science and evolving police procedures to adjudicate constitutional
matters. Expert testimony in excessive force cases “is neither re294
quired nor always appropriate.” It is the purview of the judiciary
to delineate the contours of the Constitution. Consequently, courts
alone assess the constitutionality of officer conduct. Such constitutional adjudications have the potential to be perceived as judicial
decrees when the decision appears ill-conceived. In Garner, Justice
O’Connor questioned whether weight should be given to the fact
that many states were eliminating their statutes that permitted
shooting fleeing felons when such statutes were ubiquitous when
the Bill of Rights was ratified. Many judges and scholars balk at the
notion of invoking changing social mores and emerging trends to
adjudicate constitutional matters.
Tort law, on the other hand, can use developing practices to determine the proper standard of care in various scenarios. Of
course, some of the judiciary’s gatekeeping functions are necessary
295
to ensure the testimony is generally accepted in the community.
But tort law can strike the proper balance between the constitutional floor and the aspirational ceiling of actions that could have
been taken with the benefit of perfect hindsight.
Along the same lines, in § 1983 cases, claims of negligent training or supervision cannot be based on a municipal employee’s un296
constitutional act on a respondeat superior theory. A municipality
may only be held liable when its own actions, in the form of a government policy or custom, constitute willful indifference or callous
297
disregard. Similarly, a federal agency would not be found negligent for failing to train its employees to anticipate rare or unforeseen events; there has been no history of mishandling the situa298
tion; or the wrong choice would not foreseeably cause an injury.
293. See, e.g., Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“Whether and, if so, the extent to which an expert’s philosophical bent biases her review is
a credibility determination that has always been within the province of the jury.”).
294. Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2008).
295. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (affording judges authority to determine whether the putative expert uses techniques and theories that have been generally accepted in the law enforcement community).
296. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1988).
297. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
298. Cf. Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297–98 (2d Cir. 1992) (outlining requirements to bring a failure to train claim under § 1983).
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But, while such restrictions may be significant hurdles to meritorious claims, they do not remove the allegations of negligent training and supervision entirely from the realm of judicial scrutiny.
Yet, it is axiomatic that claims of negligent hiring, training, and su299
pervision are barred under the discretionary function exception.
Federal agencies cannot be sued under the FTCA for the manner
in which they train their employees. But that immunity is illusory.
When a court finds that an employee acts negligently, the ruling
often serves as notice to the employer that its employee used substandard care. In order to prevent such damages in the future, the
employee must be retrained. The negligent training claim and the
underlying tort action are often two sides of the same liability coin.
That recognition also highlights the most important safeguard
against the threat of tort law becoming de facto policy. Public tort
law only allows for monetary damages. Injunctions, structural or
otherwise, are not permitted through FTCA claims. Plaintiffs may
not bring facial constitutional challenges against statutes or regula300
tions through tort law. Unlike lawsuits against federal employees
in their official capacity, or actions under the Administrative Procedure Act, officers cannot be sued in their individual capacity for
301
equitable or injunctive relief. Without the availability of injunctive relief, FTCA judgments are viewed as modest judicial interven302
tion. Tort adjudications are confined to the particular case or
controversy. Costly judgments may alert tortfeasors to modify future behavior. The judgment may intimate to the agency that an
employee should be retrained, but it cannot mandate such remedial measures. The agency is free to take any action: reform to prevent future judgments, gamble that the controversy will never reoccur or a future case would yield a different outcome, or simply
303
ignore the judgment based on larger policy considerations. The
decision remains squarely with the executive branch. If the discretionary function exception is designed to ensure that the authority
over federal departments and agencies remains within the execu-

299. See Gager v. United States, 149 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1998); Flynn v. United States,
902 F.2d 1524, 1531 (10th Cir. 1990).
300. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994).
301. See, e.g., Kirby v. City of Elizabeth, 388 F.3d 440, 452 n.10 (4th Cir. 2004) (providing
injunctive relief only against government employees in their official capacity); Wolfe v.
Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 360 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he declaratory and injunctive relief
Wolfe seeks is only available in an official capacity suit.”); Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1327
(2d Cir. 1993) (“[S]uch equitable relief [reinstatement] could be obtained against Relin
only in his official, not his individual, capacity.”); Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (5th
Cir. 1990) (“[T]he injunctive relief sought and won by Scott can be obtained from the defendants only in their official capacity as commissioners.”).
302. SCHUCK, supra note 22, at 16.
303. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 326.
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tive branch, the limited remedial measures available when they act
tortiously provide an equally vital protection.
Without usurping the authority of law enforcement agencies,
FTCA adjudications still have a role to play in encouraging effec304
tive decision making and fostering best practices. While only legislatures have the power to adopt criminal statutes, it is the court’s
305
role to delineate the scope of common-law torts. FTCA judgments should remain limited to monetary damages awards. Still,
without injunctive capabilities, it is all the more imperative to levy
FTCA damages against the entity that either harbors the most lia306
bility or is capable of instituting reform. Only through incurring
the financial impact of the FTCA judgment will the tortfeasor initiate that calculus. Given the manner in which FTCA settlements
and judgments are currently paid, no department or agency has
any reason to concern itself with such damage awards.
IV. THE BUREAUCRATIC PAYMENT STRUCTURE
Before advocating for disbanding the Bivens remedy in favor of
the FTCA model, the issue of deterrence must be more fully addressed. The Carlson Court reasoned that Bivens’ survival was necessary to serve a deterrent function. In rejecting the argument that
constitutional torts could be adjudicated through the FTCA, the
Court reiterated its belief that the most effective deterrent stems
from holding individual officers liable rather than governmental
employers. The remedy is particularly necessary because the FTCA
does not permit punitive damages or jury trials. 307
As a practical matter, civil servants are typically not in a financial
position to pay substantial Bivens judgments. Congress created the
FTCA law enforcement proviso in response to that economic reality. In devising the proviso, Congress understood that the judicial
remedy would often serve as a “hollow remedy” given the officers’
308
likely inability to pay the substantial judgment.

304. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 322
(1989) (suggesting that courts have an expansive role to play in policy).
305. Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N.W.2d 525, 537 (Minn. 1976) (“We could, of course,
adopt the substance of the Model Penal Code rule to be applied in tort actions involving
alleged assaults and batteries by a police officer. Though the legislature has the legitimate
authority to define crimes and defenses, we retain the common-law authority to define torts
and their defenses.”).
306. See generally Lobel, supra note 8 (finding Ziglar unpersuasive based on the false dichotomy between injunctive relief and monetary damages).
307. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
257 n.11 (1978)).
308. Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009).
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Indemnification polices further undermine the premise that a
Bivens defendant will feel the financial impact of any judgment.
309
Following an adverse verdict, Bivens defendants may submit a
written request for indemnification to the head of his employing
310
component. Then, the Department of Justice engages in a legal
inquiry to assess whether the officer acted within the scope of em311
ployment and whether “such indemnification is in the interest of
312
the United States.” Although indemnification is not a foregone
313
conclusion, given that the employing agency receives the request
314
and is responsible for the indemnification payment, it is reasonable to assume its recommendation will be afforded significant
315
weight in the decision-making process. Moreover, in instances in
which the plaintiff receives a judgment in an FTCA case, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2676 precludes a subsequent award sounding in constitutional
tort, regardless of the individual officer’s level of misconduct or
316
whether the government was found liable.
Practical limitations aside, certain remedies against individual
officers must be available to safeguard against conduct “shown to
be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless
or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of oth317
ers.” In that sense, punitive damages, in addition to the threat of
prosecution, persist as necessary deterrents. The plainly incompe318
tent and nefarious should be held personally accountable, and a
mechanism should be in place to punish officers who knowingly
violate constitutional rights. But in circumstances where the constitutional infraction is based on an agency policy or is the result of
poor training or operation techniques, public tort law focused
against the employer, rather than the employee, may prove a more
319
effective deterrent and compensatory mechanism.
Many commentators have opined that employer liability,
through the doctrine of respondeat superior, serves as a more effec-

309. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(8)(iii) (1990).
310. Id. § 50.15(c)(3) (providing pre-judgment indemnification to Bivens defendants
only in “exceptional circumstances”).
311. Id. § 50.15(c)(1).
312. Id.
313. Id. § (a)(8)(iii).
314. Id. § (c)(1)–(5).
315. Id. § (c)(4).
316. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2018).
317. Duncan v. Wells, 23 F.3d 1322, 1324 (8th Cir. 1994).
318. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 429 (2007) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 431 (1986)).
319. Hassel, supra note 59, at 477 (“Indeed, in situations in which the source of the constitutional violation is based on an agency policy, Bivens might well provide no remedy
against an individual official if he acted in good faith, while a claim under the FTCA could
reach to the systemic source of the violation.”).
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tive deterrent mechanism than individual liability. In order to foster a more critical examination of past tortious conduct, actions
based on any law enforcement activity must be internalized by the
government decision-making component. Then, this places the financial burden on an entity that is both culpable and capable of
320
effecting institutional change. Tethering the financial liability to
the employer through the doctrine of respondeat superior would increase the likelihood that decision-makers would institute best
practices to minimize the possibility of such dire confrontations. As
Yale law professor Peter H. Schuck noted in his groundbreaking
work, Suing Government, by making the agency financial responsible
for the tort judgment, and requiring them to justify the expense to
the legislative body, agencies will “be pressed to anticipate and respond to low-level misconduct by deploying their stock of behaviorshaping resources—rules, training, discipline, incentives, information, organization support, and the like—in more imaginative
321
and powerful ways.”
Notwithstanding his majority opinion in Carlson, Justice Brennan
understood the leverage derived from employer-based liability, albeit in a slightly different scenario. The jurist embraced government employer liability as a more effective deterrent than individual liability in the civil rights context:
The threat that damages might be levied against the city
may encourage those in a policymaking position to institute
internal rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional
rights. Such procedures are particularly beneficial in preventing those “systemic” injuries that result not so much
from the conduct of any single individual, but from the interactive behavior of several government officials, each of
322
whom may be acting in good faith.
Justice Brennan suggested that a city liability regime would be
more advantageous than a remedy against the individual, which

320. See Boger et al., supra note 52, at 541 (quoting Letter from Kenneth Culp Davis to
Robert Sloan, Comm. on Gov’t Operation, Nov. 26, 1973 (“What is needed is a deterrent
that operates not only against the agents but also against the superiors. The superiors will
respond to big money judgments, because the superiors have the responsibility for protecting their budgets.”)).
321. SCHUCK, supra note 22, at 184.
322. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980) (holding that municipalities could not assert qualified immunity or good faith immunity). See generally Hassel, supra
note 59, at 474 (“On the issue of deterrence, several commentators have concluded that individual liability under Bivens is not effective at getting to the causes of unconstitutional behavior.”).
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could “paralyz[e] the governing official’s decisiveness and distort[]
323
his judgment on matters of public policy.”
Although the Court recognized the benefits of government liability, it subsequently declined to imply a Bivens-style cause of ac324
tion directly against federal agencies. In FDIC v. Meyer, the plaintiff argued that qualified immunity essentially rendered Bivens
ineffective, and actions against the agency were necessary to provide adequate compensation for constitutional wrongs. The Court
rejected that argument. Noting that “the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer,” the Court reasoned, “[i]f we were to imply a damages
action directly against federal agencies, thereby permitting claimants to bypass qualified immunity, there would be no reason for
aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against individual officers. Under [plaintiff’s] regime, the deterrent effects of the Bivens
325
remedy would be lost.” The decision suggests that the individual,
rather than the agency, must ensure a meaningful deterrent. The
irony of the FDIC decision lies in the fact that while it reads as an
effort to aid plaintiffs in their attempt to hold officers accountable,
in reality it leaves the plaintiff without any effective accountability
mechanism.
If the most effective deterrent policy centers at the agency level,
then neither Bivens nor the FTCA provides an adequate remedial
structure. Bivens remedies are too provincial in that they punish
the individual actor who may or may not have instituted the policy
that led to the infraction. Indeed, scholars have opined that judges
and juries are reluctant to award damages against federal law enforcement officials in their individual capacity when such defendants are viewed as mere proxies for the employer agency and its
326
policies.
FTCA liability is premised on respondeat superior tort theory. Although the awards have the potential to influence behavior, in reality they are incurred by the government at a level too general to internalize the cost. That lack of financial impact at the agency level
327
is due to the Judgment Fund. The Judgment Fund is “a permanent, indefinite appropriation,” which means it is not part of Con-

323. Owen, 445 U.S. at 655–56.
324. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
325. Id. at 485 (emphasis in original).
326. Hassel, supra note 59, at 475 (“The reluctance of juries and judges to award damages against individual employees prevents victims of constitutional wrongs from receiving a
meaningful remedy. . . . One reason courts and jurors may be reluctant to subject an individual defendant to significant liability is the understanding that the individual is merely a
stand-in for the larger governmental entity, and that to punish an individual for a systematic
problem is unfair.”).
327. See 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2018).
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gress’s budget. 328 Congressional review is not necessary prior to
disbursing funds. In other words, Congress has virtually no oversight over a general appropriation that annually dispenses billions
329
of dollars for tort and other damages, and, as one scholar put it,
“there is no practical way for Congress or the public to track where
330
Judgment Fund money goes.” The Judgment Fund is the payment method for final judgments and most settlements under the
331
FTCA.
In tort judgments paid through the Judgment Fund, neither the
332
tortfeasor nor the agency is obligated to provide reimbursement.
The agency is under no obligation to report payments to Congress.
In FDIC v. Meyer, the Supreme Court did not outright reject the
premise of requiring the federal government to shift funds previously used to indemnify Bivens defendants towards judgments re333
sulting from constitutional actions against federal agencies. Instead, the Court merely left it to Congress to determine whether
such shifting of government liability was prudent. Any reform
aimed at fostering greater accountability should ensure that the
monetary awards for tortious conduct are levied at the government
level at which decisions are made such that the damages are a fac334
tor in the bureaucratic decision-making calculus.
V. REFORMING FEDERAL PUBLIC TORT LAW
Public tort law will never completely eliminate government misconduct. Just as criminal law cannot deter all future crimes, tort

328. For a comprehensive overview of the Judgment Fund, see Paul Figley, The Judgment
Fund: America’s Deepest Pocket & Its Susceptibility to Executive Branch Misuse, 18 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 145 (2015).
329. See id. at 146; Jenna Greene, Feds paid billions in settlements last year, NAT’L L.J. (Feb.
6, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202541306088&
Feds_paid_billions_in_settlements_last_year/.
330. Figley, supra note 328, at 147.
331. Id. at 161–65 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 84-2638, ch. 13, at 72 (1956); Hearings Before the
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong. 885, 888–89 (1956)); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 87-428, at 2–3, 5–6 (1961). In 1956, Congress created the Judgment Fund to
be the source of payment of judgments under $100,000.00. The general fund proved successful, as it relieved Congress of the obligation to execute private bills and cut down on delays for waiting victims. The Fund has had various caps over the years. As it currently stands,
the Judgment Fund is the method of payment by the federal government for most FTCA
judgments and settlements for more than $2,500.00. See Figley, supra note 328, at 161–65,
178 n.256.
332. But see 39 U.S.C. § 409(h) (2018) (requiring the Postal Service to pay judgments out
of its own agency appropriation).
333. 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994).
334. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 22, at 104 (explaining the difficulty in tethering a
deterrent policy to a particular governmental tier but opining that an appropriate target is
more often “closer to the agency head than to the individual street-level official”).
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law cannot dissuade every public official from acting wrongfully.
Public tort law should seek to compensate, deter, and incentivize,
while acknowledging its practical limitations. The remedial regime
should at times focus on incentivizing better decision making at
the agency level, and at other times punish ill-motived and reckless
officers. With that in mind, this Article offers four recommendations to reform federal public tort law. First, Congress should
amend the FTCA to make it the exclusive remedy for both constitutional and common-law torts. Second, Congress should mandate
all FTCA settlements and judgments arising from law enforcement
activity to be paid through the department or agency that employed the tortfeasor. Third, Congress should amend the FTCA to
permit punitive damages for law enforcement activity and clarify
that the discretionary function exception is not a barrier to claims’
justiciability. Fourth, Congress should require the judicial award of
punitive damages to serve as a mandatory trigger for disciplinary
procedures against the tortfeasor.
A. Amend the FTCA to Permit Constitutional Tort Claims
Congress should enact the 1978 proposed amendment to the
FTCA, recommended by the DOJ, to fold constitutional tort claims
into the statute, thereby eliminating Bivens implied causes of action. The DOJ conceived of the amendment as a way to “eliminate
the need for the Government either to defend the individual employee or—where the official may be guilty of a criminal act—to
335
obtain private counsel for him or her, at great expense.” Testifying before the Judiciary Subcommittee, then Attorney General
Griffin Bell stated that the Bivens implied cause of action created
“an unjust and counterproductive burden now weighing on the
shoulders of Government employees, the possibility of being held
liable for a sizable judgment in a civil suit brought for the way he
336
performs his job.” Mr. Bell emphasized that civil litigation against
individual officials is not only costly and destructive to morale, but
discourages employees from taking challenging assignments for
fear of financial ruin. The Attorney General questioned the premise of the deterrent effect created by employee liability. Mr. Bell
noted that, irrespective of any intended benefits to individual liability, the reality was apparent: plaintiffs rarely recover substantial

335. Joint Hearing on Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 18, at 2 (statement of Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chairman, Subcomm. On Citizens and S’Holders
Rights and Remedies).
336. Id. at 5.
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sums from the individual employee, and the remedy has no deter337
rent impact because “large judgments are so infrequent.” The
unrealized promise of Bivens, in the Attorney General’s estimation,
was not worth the burdens placed on the individual employee and
the Department, which often uses taxpayer money to hire private
counsel to represent the employee. Still, Mr. Bell recognized that
some disciplinary procedure should be established “to insure the
fair and effective disciplining of a Government employee who has
338
violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.”
In exchange for making the United States exclusively liable for
all constitutional torts, the 1978 proposal suggested that “the United States will not raise the immunity defenses now available to its
339
employees who are sued personally.” The Attorney General recognized that the elimination of qualified immunity would substantially increase the likelihood of compensation: “As a practical matter, the liability of private citizens to recover damages for
constitutional torts would be greatly increased if they need only
prove violation of their constitutional rights regardless of the good
340
faith of a Government employee.” The proposal also allowed for
monetary recovery for constitutional violations even in instances
where it was nearly impossible to prove a concrete injury. The Justice Department also affirmed its intention to make the discretion341
ary function exception inapplicable to constitutional torts.
The amendment did not pass. The contention surrounding the
amendment centered on the absence of a sufficient deterrent
342
mechanism against officer misconduct. The 1978 amendment
337. Id. at 6.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 7.
340. Id. at 8.
341. Id. at 24.
342. The Chairman of the Subcommittee questioned whether the proposed bill provided a meaningful safeguard against constitutional violations:
[I]f damages can no longer be exacted from individuals who violate constitutional
rights, what alternative sanctions can be imposed on such officials? . . . . Does this
bill create a risk that there will be no sanctions at all to deter grave constitutional
violations, no matter how outrageous or unjustified they are?
Id. at 2. Senator Abourezk went one step further:
The major problem with the bill as drafted is that in immunizing Federal officials
from any accountability through civil action, [the amendment] substitutes no effective alternative system of accountability. Instead, the bill relies on civil service
disciplinary procedures which have proven to be so inadequate and ineffectual in
the past. Perhaps if these civil service disciplinary proceedings had been adequate
and effective, there would be no need for this bill today. At a minimum, therefore, the basic elements of an effective disciplinary procedure must be included in
the bill.
Id. at 3.
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should be re-proposed. Despite the passage of time, both sides
stand to gain from the compromise. To whatever extent Congress
believed the Bivens remedy was an effective deterrent at that time,
it has not proven to be so. As detailed above, Ziglar v. Abbasi stands
as the most restrictive judicial articulation of the Bivens remedy to
date. Courts already cite that decision to decline finding an implied cause of action for constitutional violations, including alleged
Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers. Given
that virtually any fact pattern not already adjudicated by the Court
creates a new context, it is difficult to conceive of the Bivens implied cause of action serving as a robust deterrent mechanism in
the future.
Moreover, when the amendment was proposed, the doctrine of
343
qualified immunity was “greatly reduced in scope.” The goodfaith immunity was limited in the extent to which it was able to
shield officials from litigation. Under the Harlow objective standard, it has been expanded to immunize defendants in cases previ344
ously considered meritorious. These jurisprudential developments thwart compensation in cases where there may have been a
constitutional violation. Folding such claims into the FTCA would
reinstate the basic tenet that when there is a constitutional wrong,
there is a remedy.
At the same time, federal officials would gain a long sought-after
immunity. While the Westfall Act immunizes federal actors for
common-law torts committed while acting in the scope of their au345
thority, this amendment would shield them from constitutional
tort actions. The Justice Department would benefit from cutting
down on expenses related to obtaining private counsel for certain
346
defendants. As Bivens litigation can extend well beyond a decade,
these expenses add up.
Allowing the FTCA to award damages based on constitutional
torts would also come closer to creating a comprehensive tort adjudication process. Allowing for both constitutional and commonlaw tort claims based on law enforcement activity under the FTCA
would streamline litigation and allow the dual theories to serve as
complementary claims with equal remedial force. Absent qualified
immunity, there could still be remedies even in instances where
the constitutional violation was not clearly established prior to the
misconduct. Similarly, without a federal tort jurisprudence, FTCA
actions today often leave courts scrambling to find a private person
343.
344.
345.
346.

Id. at 7.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2018).
See supra Part IV.
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analogue for law enforcement activity. The statute should make
clear that federal officers’ conduct should be judged based on federal privilege law, including Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standards for intentional tort claims, such as false arrest and false
imprisonment. Further, allowing constitutional claims under the
FTCA would better harmonize actions by allowing courts to
properly characterize claims as either constitutional or commonlaw torts, and adjudicate appropriately. Given the difficult nature
of distinguishing between negligence, intentional conduct, and
privileged conduct, courts would no longer have to wade through
the scattershot categories of various defenses and immunities
based on the different causes of action; instead, a single statute
would provide the basis for all claims and defenses.
Of course, the proposal is not without its drawbacks. The obvious concern is the lack of accountability for federal officials. Making the United States exclusively liable for constitutional torts
would prevent action against the individual tortfeasor. In eliminating the Bivens remedy, aggrieved plaintiffs do not have the opportunity to hold even the most malicious officer accountable. The
additional recommendations aim to create an accountability and
deterrence regime that places liability on the responsible entity.
B. Agency Payment Structure
Congress should mandate that all FTCA settlements and judgments are paid directly out of the budgets of the employing department or agency instead of the Judgment Fund. Agencies have
no incentive to modify past practices in order to mitigate future
damages because they are not forced to dispense judgment awards
directly from their own budgets. The disconnect between the
agency and any potential award creates a perverse incentive for law
enforcement officers to either not take the litigation seriously or
view the general corpus as a hush fund to pay off aggrieved victims.
347
Many scholars have advanced similar proposals. It was also advanced by Senator Charles H. Percy, a sponsor of the FTCA law enforcement proviso, as an alternative to the 1978 proposed amendment. In Senator Percy’s estimation, the proposal
would create more direct accountability by requiring successful claims to be paid from the appropriations of the
347. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 22, at 108; Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J.
447 (1978); Joanna C. Schwartz, Watching the Detectives, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A35.
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agency whose employee committed the tort. Agencies
would feel a strong incentive to prevent tortious misconduct by their employees. Congress could, and should, look
348
into the operation of any agency which failed to do so.
This is not to suggest the elimination of the Judgment Fund.
Congress, in its wisdom, created the fund to eliminate the need for
private compensatory bills and to unburden agencies from settlement payments. The pendulum should not swing so far back that it
eliminates the many bureaucratic advantages gained through the
streamlined payment scheme. But in the instance of law enforcement activity, the need for direct accountability at the agency level
warrants a more precise remedial measure.
Of course, departments and agencies cannot be so financially
hamstrung by tort awards that it impacts their ability to perform
core operational functions. But that concern cannot also be an excuse to abdicate principled oversight. Requiring agencies to reimburse the Judgment Fund to ensure greater accountability already
exists in other tort contexts. Under the Contract Disputes Act,
agencies are required to reimburse the Judgment Fund for court
judgments and monetary awards issued by the boards of contract
349
appeals. The reimbursements come from “available funds or by
350
obtaining additional appropriations for such purposes.” The intent of the reimbursement program was to prevent agencies from
viewing the Judgment Fund as a means of terminating litigation
351
without internalizing the cost.
Similarly, federal agencies are required to reimburse the Judgment Fund for payments made in equal employment opportunity
and whistleblower cases. Before the No FEAR Act, claims resolved
at the administrative level were paid through agency funds while
litigated claims were paid through the Judgment Fund. The twotiered system created an incentive for agencies to allow claims to
lapse into litigation. In fiscal year 2000, agencies avoided paying
almost $43 million in discrimination claims because of the Judg352
ment Fund. In a Senate hearing concerning the then-proposed
348. Joint Hearing on Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 18, at 358. Senator Percy’s proposal centered on allowing plaintiffs to choose between bringing actions
sounding in constitutional torts against the United States or, in cases where the employee
acted in bad faith, maintaining an action against the individual official. As Assistant Attorney
General Barbara Babcock noted, the proposal would effectively undermine the very objective of the amendment—namely, to eliminate claims against individual officers sounding in
tort. Id. at 362.
349. 41 U.S.C. § 701(c) (2018).
350. Id. § 13(c).
351. See Figley, supra note 328, at 168.
352. S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 3.
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No FEAR Act, Senator John Warner stated, “I firmly believe that
because there is no financial consequence to their actions, Federal
agencies are essentially able to escape responsibility when they fail
to comply with the law and are unresponsive to their employees’
353
concerns.” The 2002 NO FEAR Act addressed the problem by
making agencies “more accountable for their violations of employment discrimination and whistleblower protection laws
354
brought against the agencies.”
Such accountability mechanisms likewise exist in the federal law
enforcement context. Individuals may bring civil actions to recover
money damages against the United States for willful violations of
specified sections of the Stored Communications Act and the For355
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The procedure for bringing
such an action mirrors the Federal Tort Claims Act, and aggrieved
parties must initially file a claim with the appropriate department
or agency before bringing a lawsuit in United States district
356
357
court. The case is tried without a jury. In the event of a judgment award, “[a]n amount equal to any award against the United
States . . . shall be reimbursed by the department or agency . . . that
is available for the operating expenses of the department or agency
358
concerned.” While the statute recognizes that reimbursements
cannot suppress the law enforcement capabilities of these departments of agencies, it nevertheless creates a mechanism whereby
these entities incur the financial burden through their own operating expenses.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the statute stems from the
359
administrative discipline provision. This provision attempts to

353. See Figley, supra note 328, at 163 n.187.
354. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-295R, THE JUDGMENT FUND:
STATUS OF REIMBURSEMENTS REQUIRED BY THE NO FEAR ACT AND CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT 1
(2008).
355. See 18 U.S.C. § 2712 (2018).
356. Id. § 2712(b)(1).
357. Id. § 2712(b)(3).
358. Id. § 2712(b)(5).
359. Id. § 2712(c). The provision reads,
If a court or appropriate department or agency determines that the United States
or any of its departments or agencies has violated any provision of this chapter,
and the court or appropriate department or agency finds that the circumstances
surrounding the violation raise serious questions about whether or not an officer
or employee of the United States acted willfully or intentionally with respect to
the violation, the department or agency shall, upon receipt of a true and correct
copy of the decision and findings of the court or appropriate department or
agency promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action
against the officer or employee is warranted. If the head of the department or
agency involved determines that disciplinary action is not warranted, he or she
shall notify the Inspector General with jurisdiction over the department or agency
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give teeth to the often-maligned intra-agency disciplinary process.
By requiring departments and agencies to initiate proceedings
when they receive a court’s decision, the provision attempts to limit entities’ discretion in disciplining their own employees. The disciplinary review is automatically launched upon a finding that the
employee acted willfully or intentionally. Punitive damages are
360
available when the employee’s conduct was willful or intentional.
As the statute only permits actions against the United States based
on “any willful violation,” it is arguable that all judgments should
trigger disciplinary review. Yet, the statute leaves it for the court to
find “circumstances surrounding the violation” that suggest willfulness. Given the somewhat amorphous standard, it still provides
discretion for the agency to read the court opinion and determine
whether the court intimated such circumstances.
Paying tort settlements and judgments through agency appropriations should not be seen as a panacea for government misconduct. As one commentator noted, “agencies frequently failed to reimburse the Judgment Fund for [Contract Dispute Act] payments
361
made from it on their behalf.” The Treasury Department does
362
not have the authority to compel reimbursement. Even when
judgments are paid directly through agency appropriations, they
can be viewed as little more than shifting taxpayer money around.
As federal agencies have large operating budgets, most tort judgments would have minimal impact on their fiscal bottom line. And,
if agencies are provided with more up-front money to pay judgments (whether through the Judgment Fund or elsewhere), then
the agency may remain indifferent to remedial restructuring. One
nationwide survey of jurisdictions that use a wide range of budgetary schemes to pay legal liabilities found that “[p]aying money
from a law enforcement agency’s budget does not necessarily im363
pose financial burdens on that department.”
This is not to suggest that forcing agencies to pay settlements
and judgments from their budgets would have no effect. Oftentimes, the oversight comes not merely from the payment, but when
the agency is required to get additional funds to satisfy judg364
ments : “Additional pressure may be applied when a law en-

concerned and shall provide the Inspector General with the reasons for such determination.
360. Id. § 2707(c).
361. Figley, supra note 328, at 168.
362. Id. at 169.
363. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform,
63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1150 (2016).
364. Id. at 1179–80.
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forcement agency seeks additional appropriations to cover litigation costs that go beyond their budget. But this appears to be a po365
litical pressure, not a financial one.” Forcing agencies to go to
Congress to justify their tort payments and explain how they have
taken measures to ameliorate such tortious conduct may be an important step in reasserting oversight and creating accountability.
Congress historically required agencies to report annually on all
the claims they paid through the FTCA administrative claims process. A report included a list of “the name of each claimant, the
amount claimed, the amount awarded, and a brief description of
366
the claim.” Congress repealed the reporting statute in 1965 as
367
part of its effort to reduce superfluous reporting requirements.
As the statute focused on administrative claims, that is, settlements
of $2,500.00 or less, it was understandable to eliminate such microoversight. But if law enforcement agencies were again required to
pay FTCA judgments and settlements out of their appropriations,
some reiteration of the statute would be an added tool to reintroduce congressional oversight to the public funds paid to compen368
sate for law enforcement misconduct. Otherwise, alternative regimes, such as internal risk management offices aimed at
identifying high-risk departmental practices, should be explored as
viable oversight policies.
C. Allow for Punitive Damages in FTCA Law Enforcement Cases
The Carlson Court reasoned that the availability of punitive
damages in Bivens actions serves an additional deterrent impact.
The Court believed that the threat of punitive damages must be
available against federal law enforcement officers, just as they are
against state actors in § 1983 actions. However, the extent to which
punitive damages are permitted in Bivens actions remains questionable. Although punitive damages are available in § 1983 suits,
the Supreme Court has never definitively declared as much for
369
Bivens claims. Still, the tacit acknowledgement in Carlson has
370
permitted lower courts to award punitive damages in Bivens suits.
365. Id. at 1180.
366. 28 U.S.C. § 2673 (2018).
367. Figley, supra note 328, at 178.
368. Cf. Helen Hershkoff, Missed Warning, Thirteen Chimes: Dismissed Federal-Tort Suits, Public Accountability, and Congressional Oversight, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 183, 226 (advocating for
greater oversight of FTCA claims to assess practices of the Veterans Administration).
369. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35–37 (1983).
370. Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27, 46 (D. Mass. 1999); Kaufmann
v. United States, 876 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Sanchez v. Rowe, 651 F. Supp.
571, 574 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
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The FTCA does not provide punitive damages. Allowing for such
damages under a theory of respondeat superior would appear antithetical to the purpose of such awards—namely, to punish the individual tortfeasor. Punitive damages are designed as punishment
371
for the defendant’s willful or malicious conduct. To receive punitive damages, a plaintiff must demonstrate the requisite intent, i.e.,
that the defendant’s conduct was “motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to federally
372
protected rights of others.” Punitive damages are never awarded
373
as of right. Instead, the factfinder must determine that the conduct warrants deterrence and punishment beyond mere compensatory damages.
By folding Bivens actions into the FTCA statutory framework and
allowing for punitive damages, accountability at the individual officer level would no longer be predicated on the arbitrary constitutional versus common-law tort distinction. Rather, it could return
to the subjective intent inquiry of pre-Harlow qualified immunity. It
is difficult to reconcile inflicting a substantial monetary burden on
the individual officer if the officer exercised substandard care because they were inadequately trained or improperly informed
about the circumstances they confronted. In instances where officers lacked the subjective intent to cause harm, yet nonetheless engaged in behavior with that was deemed unconstitutional after the
fact, the remedial measure should be targeted to their employers
to prevent future recurrence. At the same time, officers should be
held liable in instances where they engage the public with evil mo374
tives or intent. In that sense, a subjective intent rule is preferable.
Such a subjectively-based approach was historically the standard for
375
qualified immunity. Examining the law enforcement officer’s
subjective motives would restore the good-faith standard that was
376
the pre-Harlow test for qualified immunity.
Allowing for punitive damages would refocus the deterrence regime on a public official’s subjective intent. While plaintiffs currently must demonstrate objectively unreasonable behavior to
overcome qualified immunity, they must prove subjective intent to

371. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 n.9 (1986).
372. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56.
373. Id. at 52.
374. See, e.g., Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 975–77 (9th Cir. 2004); Bank of Jackson Cty. v. Cherry, 980 F.2d 1362, 1369–71 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding unconstitutional retaliatory action yet still applying qualified immunity).
375. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (recognizing that the Court’s original articulation of “good faith” immunity included a subjective intent element); see also
Moore, supra note 208, at 1636–37.
376. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998).
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be awarded punitive damages. 377 In the false-arrest context, punitive damages rest on the question of whether the officer arrested
the individual “knowing that he lacked probable cause to do so, or,
at least, with conscious indifference to the possibility that he lacked
378
probable cause.” This test mirrors the pre-Harlow good-faith, subject-intent standard for qualified immunity.
As that standard more accurately reflects societal understandings about when officers should be held accountable, allowing the
punitive damages inquiry in FTCA suits would permit the officer to
escape the burdens of being a defendant while still allowing the
plaintiff the ability to demonstrate that the officer’s conduct was
motivated by evil motives or intent. 379 Through the adjudication,
the court would be in a position to assess the employee’s conduct
and assess not merely tortious conduct, but ill-intended conduct.
The punitive damages would be awarded against the United States
under a respondeat superior theory of liability. However, the ruling
would be more than a heightened financial burden. Having a clear
ruling on punitive damages would provide a normative trigger for
agency response. The Article III judge’s finding of evil motive or
intent can be harnessed to punish the law enforcement officer.
Of course, a FTCA case awarding punitive damages would not
terminate the officer’s employment rights. Due process demands
that the officer be a party to the litigation that deprives him of any
380
substantive rights. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a “final
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their
privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised
381
in that action.” Offensive collateral estoppel occurs when a
“plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from relitigating an issue
the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another ac-

377. Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 26 n.8 (1st Cir. 1999).
378. Id.
379. See generally Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different? Bivens and National Security, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1123 (defending Bivens limitations based, in part, on monetary damages extracted from individuals causing “overdeterrence”).
380. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (identifying “guideposts” for
determining whether defendant had adequate notice of repercussions of punitive damages).
381. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); see also Astoria Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v.
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107–08 (1991) (the court has “long favored application of the
common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to
those determinations of administrative bodies that have attained finality . . . . The principle
holds true when a court has resolved an issue and should do so equally when the issue has
been decided by an administrative agency, be it state or federal, which acts in a judicial capacity.”). This is not to be confused with collateral estoppel, which holds that “once a court
has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action . . . .” Allen, 449 U.S. at 94; cf.
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291–92 (1984) (declining to find § 1983
action estopped due to an arbitration award under a collective bargaining agreement).
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tion against the same or a different party.” 382 In order for the prior
adjudication to have preclusive effect, the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to conduct discovery and mount a meaning383
ful defense. Under the proposed change, individual officers
would likely be deposed and testify at trial, they would not be
named parties in the lawsuit, lest it defeat the very purpose of encapsulating the Bivens remedy into FTCA statutory scheme. Because the officer would not have been a named party in the preceding FTCA case, the judgment would not have a preclusive effect
on the subsequent disciplinary proceeding. In other words, an Article III court’s punitive damages award cannot be dispositive of
the issue of the officer’s evil motive or intent. The agency would
still be required to initiate removal proceedings and, if there is a
final order on termination, that ruling would be appealable to the
384
Merit Systems Protection Board.
Still, creating clear statutory guidelines for disciplinary action
would provide a level of accountability and transparency currently
lacking in the purely intra-agency system. Inspectors General and
the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility are
often tasked with investigating law enforcement conduct that give
rise to Bivens and FTCA actions. Yet that level of intra-agency review was not sufficient to persuade Congress to adopt DOJ’s previously proposed FTCA amendment. Under this recommendation,
Article III judges could examine the tortious conduct and determine whether liability falls with the agency for institutional substandard practices or the employee for acting with willful motives.
In the event the conduct was willful, the decision should automati-

382. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159 (1984).
383. See Brockman v. Wyoming Dep’t of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1166–67 (10th Cir.
2003) (finding that action was precluded because, in a prior proceeding, plaintiff was represented by counsel and had an opportunity to conduct discovery); Travers v. Jones, 323 F.3d
1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that First Amendment claim was precluded by a county
merit system hearing in which plaintiff had the opportunity to present and cross-examine
witnesses); Littlejohn v. United States, 321 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring issue to
have been fully litigated); Layne v. Campbell Cty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 939 F.2d 217, 219–
21 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that county’s grievance procedure provided employees with adequate opportunity to litigate, thereby precluding § 1983 action, despite fact that there was
no opportunity for court review of adverse finding); see also Hall v. Marion School Dist. No.
2, 31 F.3d 183, 191–92 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that the fact that the decision-makers had
“ex parte knowledge of the dispute being adjudicated before them” suggested they were not
acting in a judicial capacity); Wade v. Hopper, 993 F.2d 1246, 1252 (7th Cir. 1993) (issue
that plaintiff “had the opportunity to litigate” in adverse bankruptcy proceeding precluded
subsequent Bivens action on the same set of operative facts).
384. See generally Jacobs v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 35 F.3d 1543, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(“Decisions of the Board are affirmed unless they are found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; [or] (3) unsupported by
substantial evidence.”).
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cally trigger disciplinary action aimed towards termination and
place ultimate liability where it belongs.
D. Disciplinary Committee
Congress’s historic reluctance to merge Bivens claims into the
FTCA is understandable given the lack of employee accountability
within the statutory scheme. The Justice Department was amenable
to creating a more robust disciplinary procedure for employees
who violated individual’s constitutional rights. That procedure included allowing injured persons to participate “in a meaningful
way.” 385 But without more than a mere concession to allow for citizen participation, Congress was unsure the disciplinary proceed386
ings would be an adequate substitute for lawsuits. By allowing for
punitive damages in FTCA cases, Congress could mandate that any
such award based on a finding of the officer’s ill-intent automatically triggers a disciplinary proceeding against the tortfeasor. Such
a judgment would not lead to an Inspector General report but automatic termination proceedings.
The skeletal framework for a more meaningful disciplinary procedure has been outlined in the civil action statutes of the Stored
Communications Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
387
Act. The statute provides guideposts for agency action based on
Article III court adjudications by requiring the department or
agency to initiate a proceeding based on a judgment that an em388
ployee may have acted willfully or intentionally. While the employee was not a direct defendant, the court’s determination that
his or her conduct was willful or intentional becomes the basis for
disciplinary action. The statute mandates that the department
389
“shall” initiate such proceedings. The decision of whether to
commence an investigation is not left to the agency.
The statute provides significant discretion. The proceeding is initiated only if the court decision “raise[s] a serious question” about
whether the employee acted willfully or intentionally. Moreover,
the court ruling does not automatically trigger a disciplinary action. Rather, it merely requires an investigation into whether such
an action is warranted. The intra-agency investigation still affords

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Joint Hearing on Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 18, at 6.
Id. at 353–55.
18 U.S.C. § 2712 (2018).
See id. § 2712(c).
Id.
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substantial discretion and leaves it to the bureaucratic institution
to determine what warrants such discipline.
Punitive damages under the FTCA would provide the normative
trigger for disciplinary action that removes the discretion from the
administrative process. Parroting the civil action statute for the
Stored Communications Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress could amend the FTCA to mandate that any
time a court awards punitive damages for law enforcement activity,
the department or agency shall initiate disciplinary action against
the appropriate employee or employees who committed the tortious conduct. In the event an agency fails to do so, the aggrieved
party who brought the underlying civil action may initiate such a
proceeding through the employing agency’s Inspector General.
Devising special terms of employment that are unique for law
enforcement officers has legal precedent. One statutory provision
calls for mandatory removal from employment for law enforce390
ment officers convicted of felonies. Before the statute was enacted, agencies were permitted to fire law enforcement officers con391
victed of felonies, although such action was not required. The
statute, however, explicitly does not prohibit the individual from
employment in any position other than as a law enforcement officer. Moreover, statutes provide for removing a public officer for
392
legal cause. Public officials also may be removed from office due
393
to misconduct in performing their official duties.
An FTCA claim settlement would likely not include punitive
damages and, consequently, would not trigger disciplinary proceedings against the tortfeasor. The plaintiff would need to decide
whether to accept the offered financial compensation or continue
litigation in an effort to hold the individual officer accountable.
Such litigation would not guarantee disciplinary repercussions
against the officer, as the subsequent hearing would include sufficient due process procedures before termination or demotion.
Still, given the limited capability of the current structure, this reform provides a concrete legal mechanism for greater compensation, agency-level deterrence, and tangible accountability.

390. 5 U.S.C. § 7371 (2018).
391. Canava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 817 F.3d 1348, 1349 (2016).
392. See, e.g., Phillips v. Dep’t of Air Force, 145 Fed. App’x 371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming for-cause removal of employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7513 for failing to maintain security clearance); 67 C.J.S. OFFICERS § 232 (Westlaw 2018); id. § 233 (“Ordinarily, the
term ‘for cause’ means for reasons that the law, and sound public policy, recognize as sufficient grounds for removal and not merely a cause that the appointing power in the exercise
of discretion may deem sufficient.”).
393. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bd. v. Isenberg, 421 S.W.2d 81 (Ky. 1967); see also Foster v.
Dep’t of Public Welfare, 159 So. 2d 515 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1963).
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CONCLUSION
The proposed legislation would amend the Federal Tort Claims
Act to make the United States the exclusive defendant in cases
against the government sounding in constitutional and commonlaw torts. Drawing on an amendment first proposed by the U.S.
Department of Justice in 1978, this recommendation would provide for greater compensation to aggrieved parties by eliminating
qualified immunity and permitting actions based on constitutional
infractions. Although the FTCA and Bivens remedial regimes were
devised to compensate different tortious conduct, their interrelated histories and immunities are integral to understanding how
public tort law has failed to provide effective compensation, accountability, and deterrence in the law enforcement context.
Bivens actions may have been perceived as a necessary deterrent for
officer misconduct, but the implied cause of action lost the Supreme Court’s favor within its first decade. To whatever extent it
may have persisted, Ziglar v. Abbasi proved the death knell of the
Bivens remedy. Even where actions are cognizable, qualified immunity has become a nearly insurmountable hurdle.
Rather than eulogize Bivens actions, we must recognize that
common-law tort claims often address law enforcement activity beyond the scope of constitutional analysis. Law enforcement cases
involving alleged excessive force often result from antecedent negligence rather than traditional notions of intentional misconduct.
By bolstering the FTCA to make agencies more financially accountable, this proposed legislation shifts the deterrent focus onto
to the agency by advocating that the employer is better able to
modify future behavior and institute training and practices that focus on tortious, as well as unconstitutional, behavior.
The proposed legislation creates a deterrent mechanism at the
agency level by requiring all settlements and judgments for claims
arising from constitutional and intentional torts to be paid
through agency appropriations. At the same time, effective disciplinary procedures must be established to ensure officer accountability. By allowing for modest punitive damages, FTCA judgments
can provide a normative trigger for mandatory disciplinary action
aimed at terminating employees who commit torts with willful or
malicious motive. This adjudicative regime would permit courts to
properly characterize the tortious conduct and place liability at the
governmental level most responsible for the misconduct.

